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Abstract 
Survival depends on the ability to rapidly detect emotionally significant stimuli, and adapt one's 
behavior accordingly. When an emotional stimulus occurs, attention is involuntarily diverted to it, 
causing a disruption in performance in a concurrent task. Emotional distractors not only capture 
attention but also engage cortico-limbic motivational systems, as reflected by several 
electrophysiological changes. In terms of cortical responses, it is well established that emotional 
pictures elicit a larger late positive potential (LPP) than neutral ones. The behavioral interference 
and emotional modulation of the LPP have been interpreted as evidence that emotional stimuli are 
prioritized in terms of perception, and that the engagement of motivational systems occurs 
automatically. However, few studies have examined whether we can learn to ignore constantly 
irrelevant emotional stimuli through direct experience. The current thesis examines the extent to 
which experience with task-irrelevant images modulates attentional capture by emotional (pleasant 
and unpleasant) pictures, and which stage of emotional processing is affected by distractor 
experience. In Experiment 1 (Experiments 1a and 1b), the role of distractor experience was 
examined in terms of distractor frequency, showing that frequent exposure to distracting images 
reduced the interference of novel (never repeated) emotional stimuli, even when they were rare, 
and consequently, highly significant. In line with this finding, Experiment 2 (Experiments 2a and 2b) 
provided evidence that practice with variable distracting images reduced the emotional 
interference effect. Conversely, the affective modulation of the LPP persisted despite the frequent 
occurrence of distractors and the prolonged exposure to distractors. Altogether these findings 
suggest that evaluative processes are mandatory, and continue to engage motivational systems, as 
suggested by the affective modulation of the LPP. However, observers can adaptively ignore 
irrelevant emotional stimuli after the evaluation process has occurred, indicating that the ability to 
overcome emotional attentional capture results directly from experience with distracting events, 
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Imagine you have just received this thesis to review and decide to read it in a coffee house in the 
city center. The café, however, is crowded and remaining concentrated on it despite the noise 
becomes challenging; people come in and out, making the doorbell ring continuously, the barman 
calls people loudly when their coffee is ready, and a baby starts to cry. You're getting a general idea 
about the content of the thesis; however, you'll need to ignore all those distractors in order to 
understand what you are reading efficiently. 
This everyday example highlights one of our major critical tasks: responding selectively to 
the subset of stimuli that is the most relevant in a given moment, and ignoring the vast sea of 
irrelevant information in which we are literally immersed. This selective prioritization and 
suppression of information has been attributed to a set of many different processes that is 
collectively termed attention. Acting as a screening process, attention is the determinant of which 
aspects of sensory input are selected for cognitive processing, memory storage, and awareness. 
Regarding this thesis, the crucial issue is the extent to which attention is involuntarily drawn 
or “captured” by emotional events, and whether such capture is modulated by the observer’s 
experience with the stimuli. This work provides evidence that different types of experience – 
namely: frequency of distractor occurrence (Experiment 1a, Experiment 1b) and extensive practice 
(Experiment 2a, Experiment 2b) - are effective in attenuating susceptibility to emotional distraction, 
as indexed by the behavioral interference effect. However, evaluation processes and motivational 
systems continue to be engaged regardless of the degree to which observers are exposed to 
distracting stimuli, as indexed by the affective modulation of the LPP. Therefore, although the 
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evaluation of emotional stimuli is mandatory, there are top-down rejection mechanisms that 
attenuate or prevent further allocation of attention toward clearly inconsequential emotional 
stimuli, and hence prevent counterproductive and reiterated emotional distraction.   
In this introduction, I will start by selectively reviewing some of the studies that are relevant 
in demonstrating an effect of experience and learning on the attentional capture by perceptually 
salient neutral stimuli, before discussing the main findings that demonstrate that attention is also 
diverted to motivationally significant stimuli; however, such capture seems to be resistant to the 
top-down control and contextual factors. 
 
1.1. Characterization of visual attention 
Humans are fairly unique in their reliance on sight as the dominant sense, which is reflected in the 
finding that the largest part of our brain is devoted to the processing of visual information. With its 
hundred billion neurons and several hundred trillion synaptic connections, our brain is a massively 
parallel computational system able to process large amounts of visual information in a matter of 
seconds. Yet, counter-intuitively to this complexity, it is incapable of processing all the incoming 
information with which it is bombarded, and attention is therefore necessary to select which stimuli 
get access to this capacity-limited process. However, in turn, attention has been considered a 
capacity-limited resource allocator (e.g., Broadbent, 1957; Kahneman, 1973; Luck & Vecera, 2002). 
If we can barely attend to one piece of information at a time and we can scarcely focus on two tasks 
simultaneously, an obvious question arises: what is attended to? How is it decided which 
information to prioritize and which to ignore? 
In a multi-item scene, in which different stimuli compete for attention, some control process 
is required to resolve this competition in order to allow some stimuli to be selected over others. 
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Prominent models have converged to distinguish two main categories of process underlying the 
control of attention allocation (e.g., Posner, 1980; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Yantis, 2000; Corbetta 
& Shulmann, 2002; Theeuwes, 2010). The most intuitive way in which attentional control has been 
categorized is in terms of one’s current goal, knowledge, and expectation. To return to my opening 
example, if we have to correct this thesis or we would like to eat a dark chocolate muffin, we will 
obviously attend to the stimuli that help us to reach these goals (the printed copy of the thesis, or 
the red packet we know that the chocolate muffin is wrapped in), and we won’t attend to those that 
are not inherent. In this case, when attention allocation is initiated in line with the “internal state” of 
the observer one refers to this as top-down attentional control (sometimes referred to as 
endogenous or goal-directed control). 
It may happen, however, that while reading this thesis or searching for the muffin, the loud 
crash of a coffee mug on the floor or a dog near the glass window that suddenly barks and growls 
makes our head turn rapidly, distracting us from the task at hand. Irrespective of whether we attend 
to these stimuli overtly (i.e., shifting attention by moving the head and eyes) or covertly (i.e., 
without eye movements), when a stimulus diverts or “captures” attention due to its intrinsic 
properties, attention is said to be under bottom-up control (also referred to as exogenous or 
stimulus-driven control), and stimuli capable of producing this involuntary attentional bias are 
events with perceptually salient or motivationally significant properties, or novel events. Compared 
to the volitional top-down control, in which the information needs to be directed from the higher 
cortical areas to the earlier ones in order to guide selection, bottom-up control is usually faster (e.g., 






1.2. The attentional capture debate 
The discovery of the attentional capture phenomenon was a significant one, in that it suggested 
that attention is not strictly under our will and intention. As a result, considering the implications 
that this phenomenon entails for everyday behaviors, a huge research effort has been conducted to 
investigate under which conditions attention is involuntarily diverted by certain stimuli and whether 
such attentional capture is mandatory, and immune to modulation by top-down control. 
From this research at least three different theoretical perspectives have traditionally emerged. 
 
Figure 1.1. Typical paradigms used for studying attentional capture, which have empirically demonstrated the bottom-up salience 
perspective (A) and the contingent attentional capture perspective (B and C). Modified from Gaspelin & Luck (2016) (A and B), and 
Folk et al. (1992) (C).  
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I. Bottom-up salience perspective 
On one hand, the bottom-up salience perspective argues that initially, after the moment light hits 
the retina, attention is exclusively guided by the relative salience of objects and, only later, goals and 
intentions bias the visual selection in a top-down manner (see Theeuwes, 2010, for a review). 
According to this account, any class of features can automatically capture attention as long as it 
stands out from the environment, and, hence, when it significantly differs from the surrounding 
features. The strongest evidence of this comes from the additional singleton paradigm. As shown in 
Figure 1.1a, in the typical version, participants are instructed to look for a unique shape (target) 
among homogeneous shapes (e.g., a circle among diamonds) and to respond to the orientation of 
the inner line of this “singleton”. In some trials, one of the non-target shapes appears as a singleton 
in a different dimension (e.g., color: a red item among green items); in this case, although the target 
is never the color singleton and participants know they can ignore it, its presence slows down 
search times. Critically, when the singleton distractor is less salient than the target (e.g., a light blue 
item among bright green items), it no longer disrupts performance (e.g., Theeuwes, 1992; 1994). 
Thus, the cost in response times - named distractor interference effect - is taken as a demonstration 
that the most salient object in the visual display always captures attention, irrespective of one’s 
current goals. 
 
II. Contingent attentional capture perspective 
On the other hand, other research indicates that stimuli do not have the intrinsic capacity to 
capture attention. According to the contingent attentional capture perspective, objects capture 
attention when they contain attributes or features associated with the task goal, and hence if they 
match what the observer is actively looking for (i.e., the attentional set of the observer) (Folk, 
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Remington & Johnston, 1992). Going back to the example in which we look for a muffin in a coffee 
shop, knowing that its wrapper is red biases the selection processes in such a way that our attention 
can be involuntary attracted by other red objects, but we ignore salient items that fall outside our 
attentional set. 
The first evidence for this perspective is primarily provided by a spatial cueing paradigm in which 
the feature properties that define distractors and targets can be independently manipulated. Folk et 
al. (1992) (Fig 1.1c), for example, presented participants with a cue display consisting of clusters of 
four dots appearing around each of four boxes. One set of dots (the cue) was a color singleton since 
it differed in color (red) compared to the rest (white). The target display appeared after the cue 
display and consisted of the abrupt onset of a single “X” or “=” appearing inside one of the four 
boxes, and participants responded to the identity of this target character. Importantly, across trials 
the target was no more likely to appear in the cued location than in any of the uncued locations, 
providing no incentive to voluntarily allocate attention to the color cue. Thus, any obtained cueing 
effects would be attributed to involuntary shifts of spatial attention. Critically, no cueing effects 
were obtained for color singleton cues. However, when the cue was replaced by the abrupt onset of 
a single set of dots around one of the four boxes, participants were faster in detecting the target 
when it appeared in the same, rather than a different, cue location. Vice versa, when the target was 
a color singleton (red “X” among three white non-targets “=”), the exact same abrupt onset cue that 
produced capture when paired with an onset target now had no effect on performance, whereas 
the same color singleton cue that produce no evidence of capture when paired with an onset target 
now produced a significant cueing effect. These findings have been replicated in numerous studies, 
indicating that attentional capture depends strictly on the top-down attentional set adopted by the 
observer (e.g., Folk et al., 1992; Folk, Remington & Wright, 1994; Folk & Remington, 1998; 2008). 
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Within this perspective, given that in the additional singleton paradigm the target is a shape 
singleton, participants may search for it by adopting the strategy to look for singletons more in 
general (singleton detection mode), attending sometimes to the singleton shaped target (correctly) 
and sometimes to the singleton colour distractor (incorrectly). Supporting this view, the distractor 
interference effect is eliminated by adding different shapes to the display so that participants are 
forced to search for the exact shape that defines the target (i.e., feature search mode) instead of its 
uniqueness (Fig 1.1b) (Bacon & Egeth, 1994; Leber & Egeth, 2006a). Thus, these findings support 
the top-down theories which indicate that attention is initiated in line with the goal of the observers 
and stimuli can involuntary capture attention when they match these goals, not in virtue of their 
perceptual salience. 
Consistent with the account of an attentional set, other studies suggest that observation of capture 
reflects the absence of an active set for the target property, rather than the inability of top-down 
control to override capture. For example, it is shown that when attention is unfocused, onset stimuli 
are able to distract; but if attention is completely focused on the upcoming target location prior to 
the onset, distraction is eliminated, indicating that attentional capture is not immune to modulation 
of top-down control. 
 
III. Special classes perspective 
A different explanation in the attentional capture debate comes from the special classes 
perspective, according to which certain classes of stimuli have a “special” status in the attention 
allocation system. Support for this perspective comes from an irrelevant singleton paradigm 
developed by Yantis and Jonides (1984; 1990) in which they required subjects to indicate whether a 
target letter (“A” in this example) was presented among heterogeneous non-target letters. In these 
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experiments, each trial began with a set of figure-eight placeholders from which, a second later, a 
search letter array was revealed by removing some elements from the placeholders (offset items) 
and by simultaneously presenting a letter at a previously blank location (abrupt onset item). 
Although the target was no more likely to be the onset letter than any of the offset letters, and 
hence participants were disincentivized to attend to this feature, detection of the target was faster 
when it was the onset item compared to when it was one of the offset items. Moreover, reaction 
times for onset targets were unaffected by the display size, which suggests that participants did not 
bother searching the offset letters when the onset letter was the target. Critically, no effect was 
found when the target showed a difference in color or luminance (e.g., Jonides & Yantis, 1988; 
Yantis & Egeth, 1999). These results are interesting in that they dissociate from the previous 
perspective; differently from the bottom-up salience perspective, these results suggest that an 
abrupt onset singleton, and not the most salient stimulus in general, is a “special” event that is able 
to automatically capture attention, due only to its intrinsic properties. In contrast with the 
contingent attentional capture perspective, from this paradigm it emerges that onset attracts 
attention even when participants adopt a feature search mode, and therefore indicates that an 
active attentional set cannot override onset capture. 
Subsequent studies provided evidence that other classes of events enjoy this “special status”, such 
as the appearance of new objects (Yantis & Hillstrom, 1994), and looming and sudden motion 
(Franconeri & Simons, 2003).  Specifically, in an experiment similar to that by Jonides and Yantis 
(1988), Franconeri and Simons (2003) showed that behavioral responses were slower when one of 
the irrelevant letters had an abrupt onset, or was a looming or translating stimulus compared to 
when the distinctive item was the target, suggesting that observers attended to these features even 
when to do so was counterproductive. From these findings, authors revisited the special class 
perspective in their “behaviorally urgent hypothesis” by suggesting that all types of stimuli 
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considered to be “behaviorally urgent” capture attention obligatorily, independently of the current 
top-down goal. In that sense, objects that appear or move suddenly and looming objects may 
indicate the potential need for a prompt reaction, and the attentional allocation system could 
therefore be evolved to detect them as rapidly as possible. For example, noticing an object that 
looms progressively closer to us is crucial in order to move and avoid the collision. In support of this 
hypothesis, the authors found that an object that does not require an immediate response, such as 
a receding stimulus, does not capture attention even though it is as dynamic as a looming object, 
thus excluding the possibility that moving objects represent a special class per se. Even when the 
receding object is the only dynamic stimulus among static stimuli, the same attention is not 
allocated as would be given to a looming object, regardless of its salience and uniqueness. In more 
recent years, in a similar evolutive perspective, other classes of “behaviorally significant” stimuli 
such as biological motion (Pratt, Radulescu, Guo & Abrams, 2010), rare and unexpected stimuli (e.g., 
Turatto & Pascucci, 2016; Neo & Chua, 2006; Horstmann, 2002), and emotional stimuli (e.g., Failing 
and Theeuwes, 2017; Lang and Bradley, 2010) have been considered capable of capturing 
mandatory attention, independently of the top-down control. 
In summary, the interpretation of evidence supporting an automatic, bottom-up attentional 
capture has given rise to a debate that still continues after 20 years. Problematically, over time, each 
different perspective has found support in empirical results from specific paradigms; some 
paradigms have consistently been used to support top-down, contingent explanations of capture 
(e.g., contingent cueing paradigm: Folk et al., 1992; contingent blink paradigm: Folk, Leber & Egeth, 
2002) and some support stimulus-driven, bottom-up salience explanations of capture (e.g., 
irrelevant singleton paradigm: Yantis & Jonides, 1984; additional singleton paradigm: Theeuwes, 
1992). Critically, results across paradigms are often conflicting, making it difficult to falsify one of 
them (e.g., Roque, Wright & Boot, 2016). Overall, despite evidence showing that top-down control 
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affects attentional capture, there are certain events that are capable of grabbing our attention no 
matter what we are doing or what we are looking for (just think of the flashing blue lights of an 
ambulance) (see Folk, 2015). Is attentional capture by salient events mandatory and impenetrable 
by top-down capture? In attentional control literature, great efforts have been made to converge 
toward a coherent resolution to this long-running debate. 
 
1.3. Experience-mediated attentional learning 
As far as common real-world situations are concerned, it is rare for us to interact in complex 
contexts without any expectations; indeed, we usually acquire expectations and redundancies about 
the environment as we gain experience. In this regard, experience and learning represent important 
determinants of how we select relevant information and ignore constantly irrelevant input. 
In accordance with this view, a growing number of studies has converged to indicate that an 
observer’s experience with a given feature or context biases the way in which attention is driven. 
One demonstration is the well-documented “priming of pop-out”, which describes the effect by 
which a stimulus (feature) that has been repeatedly attended to in the recent past is more rapidly 
selected on the current trial (e.g., Maljkovich & Nakayama, 1994; 1996; Folk & Remington, 2008; 
Lamy & Kristjansson, 2013). For example, during search tasks participants were faster at identifying 
a target when the target-distractor color remained the same as that of the previous trial compared 
to when the color changed, and this facilitation occurred for up to eight consecutive trials, 
regardless of the participants’ awareness of repetitions (Maljkovich & Nakayama, 2000). Although 
short-lasting, intertrial priming provided the first evidence of an attentional bias to items that had 
been previously attended to. 
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In addition, well-known substantiation of a long-lasting experience effect is provided by a 
series of works by Leber and co-workers (Leber & Egeth, 2006a; 2006b; Leber, Kawahara & Gabari, 
2009; but see also Cosman & Vecera, 2014), who show how the current search mode or top-down 
goals are influenced by past experiences with contexts requiring a specific type of search rather 
than another. In one of their studies (2006b), two separate groups of observers were trained to use 
different strategies to detect a color target in a search array. One group of observers was trained on 
a “singleton search” task in which they reported the identity of a varying shape target (circle, 
triangle or square) that appeared among homogeneously shaped non-targets (e.g., all square) (fig. 
1a), while the other group was trained on a “feature search” task in which they were instructed to 
search for a target of consistent shape (e.g., always a circle) among heterogeneously shaped non-
targets (fig. 1b). Crucially, after the training, the two groups were transferred to a test phase in 
which they had to detect a specific shaped target (always a circle) among homogeneously shaped 
non-targets (squares). Testing trials were “optional” in that they could be performed in either a 
singleton search mode (search for the uniquely colored target) or a feature search mode (search 
specifically for the circle target). During the training, as discussed earlier (paragraph 1.2), only the 
singleton search group’s attention was captured by an irrelevant color singleton distractor, and this 
interference effect was strongly attenuated for the feature search group. Interestingly, during the 
option trials, the singleton search group continued to show a greater interference effect compared 
to the feature search group, clearly indicating that participants used their past experience in the 
training phase to search for the target in the following test phase. Moreover, participants continued 
to employ the search mode adopted in the preview even when tested after a week (Leber et al., 
2009). 
Taken together, these findings give the first indications that attentional capture by salient 
events is attenuated or even prevented when observers have experience with the task and its 
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stimuli. Overall, the intertrial priming phenomenon may indicate that observers learn “what to 
attend to” over time, and hence learn to prioritize the task-relevant stimuli. In line with this, there 
are powerful demonstrations that the continuous selection of a certain target feature determines 
long-lasting attentional bias toward the feature per se, causing its involuntary selection even when it 
is no longer relevant for the task (Awh, Belopolsky & Theeuwes, 2012). An elegant demonstration 
comes from the study of Lin, Lu and He (2016), in which they split experiments into distinct phases: 
an initial training session and a subsequent test session. During the training, participants had to 
detect and discriminate the orientation of a “T” target letter presented among three “L” non-target 
letters. All the letters were presented inside differently colored circles and, unknown to the 
participants, the target was always inside a specifically colored circle (e.g., green). During the test 
phase, the above-mentioned color could be present or absent but, critically, it was never associated 
with the target. The authors found that response times in the test were slower when the color was 
present than when it was absent, suggesting that observers still attended to it. Such a paradigm is 
elegant in showing, in a simple way, how stimuli are unintentionally prioritized on the basis of past 
experience, knowledge and expectation of the observer (i.e., her/his internal state). Thus, such 
attentional bias – operationalized as “selection history” (Awh et al., 2012; Theeuwes, 2018)- 
resembles the contingent attentional capture in that both are suggested to be mediated by some 
involuntary processes of top-down control (Gaspelin & Luck, 2018; Egeth, 2018; Wolfe, 2018). 
The conclusion that target features are prioritized over time is supported by parallel studies 
using explicit cues to signal the target feature on a trial-by-trial basis. From this literature (e.g., 
Bundesen, 1990; Bundesen, Habekost & Kyllingsbæk 2005), it has been proposed that the top-down 
guidance of attention to target objects requires mechanisms of attention to select objects 
containing the target features. Thus, a representation of what the target is expected to be is 
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established with experience and this attentional template is used to set sensory gain, guide 
attention, and eye-movement. 
 
1.3.1. Experience with distractor stimuli 
The studies discussed in the previous section clearly show that experience plays a crucial role in 
multi-item scenes in which task-relevant objects compete with salient task-irrelevant objects, and 
research has shown that the brain has mechanisms for prioritizing further occurrence of the task-
relevant stimulus and improving performance. Yet, these studies did not explicitly address whether 
exposure to salient task-irrelevant stimuli is important in order to attenuate distraction, and hence 
improve performance. In other words, is an experience with a target feature sufficient to improve 
task performance or is an experience with distractor stimuli necessary to configure attention away 
from salient irrelevant features?   
One of the most interesting demonstrations that we are able to use distractor information in 
order to prevent distraction is provided by Arita, Carlisle and Woodman (2012), who showed that 
observers use cues signaling task-irrelevant features to the same extent to which they use cues 
signaling task-relevant features. Specifically, by giving observers a pre-cue indicating the color of the 
target (e.g., red), the distractor (e.g., blue), or a control cue that showed features different from 
those of both the target and the distractor (e.g., green) before the search display, they found not 
only the shortest RTs with the target cue but, more interestingly, also shorter RTs with the distractor 
cue compared to the neutral cue. The authors suggest that the negative cue was used to quickly 
instantiate a distractor template (‘template for rejection’) that reliably facilitated the search by 
avoiding distractor processing. In view of this concept, just as ‘knowing what to look for’ can be 
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used to bias attention toward relevant information, ‘knowing what not to look for’ is effectively used 
to bias attention away from irrelevant features. 
 
In the next section, I will review studies that have aimed to investigate how susceptibility to 
distraction is affected by an observer’s experience with salient task-irrelevant stimuli and the 
subtended cognitive mechanisms, before converging their findings into common theoretical 
frameworks. Altogether, they provide evidence that different types of experience with salient 
distractors, namely (i) repetition of the same stimulus, (ii) frequency of occurrence of the stimulus, 
and (iii) extensive exposure to variable stimuli, are effective in attenuating their distracting effect, 
suggesting that the attention allocation system learns to reject distractors over time and, hence, our 
brain has mechanisms for adaptively preventing the unwanted reiterated distraction. 
 
1.3.1.1. Exposure to the same distracting stimulus 
I. Experience as repeated exposure (practice) to a stimulus 
For decades, it has been well-known that the repeated presentation of a stimulus results in a 
reduction in the physiological response to it (Sokolov, 1963). However, only recently have 
investigation begun into whether the strength with which a salient stimulus captures attention is 
reduced as a result of its repetition, and, as a consequence, whether its interference effect on a 





Figure 1.2. Upper: Schematic representation of trial sequence of (A) Turatto and Pascucci’s paradigm with focused attention (2016, 
Experiment 2), and the spatial cueing paradigm used by Vecera et al. (2014, Experiment 2B). Below: In each study, mean RTs for 
distractor present and distractor absent trials split by epoch. 
 
 
For example, in Turatto and Pascucci’s study (2016; Experiment 1) (Fig 1.2a), participants were 
required to report the orientation of a target whose position was signalled in advance by a cue. In 
half of the trials, before the occurrence of the target – and after the cue - the abrupt onset of a 
bright annulus was presented. Authors found that attention was initially captured by the abrupt 
onsets, indicating that the processing of salient information was prioritized in a way that such 
capture could not be prevented even by strongly focusing attention on the task-relevant location; 
critically, however, distractor interference in the ongoing task reduced rapidly over time. 
Similar findings have been found using a spatial cueing paradigm (Folk et al., 1992; see 
paragraph 1.2 for the description of the paradigm and main results) in a series of studies by Vecera, 
Cosman, Vatterott & Roper (2014; Experiment 1 a, b). The authors found that the presentation of an 
irrelevant distracting cue affected the rapidity with which participants detected a target, even 
though it did not match the target feature. However, the cueing effect varied throughout the 
experiment, with the greatest cueing effect at the beginning and no effect when participants 
performed a practice phase with the task, indicating, importantly, that searching consistently for a 
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specific target feature over several blocks of trials was not sufficient to prevent attentional capture 
(fig. 1.2b); only repeated exposure to the distractor was able to do this (Vecera et al., 2014 – 
Experiment 2a,2b). Therefore, the specific experience with the salient distracting stimulus is 
determinant for attenuating distraction, rather than a mere experience with the task or with the 
target feature. 
The experimental approaches that I have briefly reviewed are very interesting because they 
demonstrate an attentional capture by salient onset distractors in two paradigms that were 
traditionally employed for empirically supporting top-down theories of attentional control. As 
described in the previous paragraph (par. 1.2), the failure to find distractor interference in 
paradigms in which target and distracting features do not match (Folk et al., 1992) was considered 
to be evidence that stimuli do not have the intrinsic ability to capture attention and are involuntarily 
selected only if they match the current top-down attentional set. Similarly, the attenuation of 
interference in paradigms in which attention is fully focused in advance (e.g., Yantis and Jonides, 
1990), or in paradigms that incentivize a feature search mode, supports the idea that attentional 
capture is prevented when there is an active attentional set, and hence it is neither top-down 
impenetrable nor mandatory. The crucial point is that Turatto and Pascucci (2016) and Vecera et al. 
(2014) adopted these paradigms but did not examine only aggregate data as done in previous 
studies; they tracked the participant’s performance over time by epoching the data in bins of trials. 
In so doing, they have demonstrated that an abrupt onset captures initial attention even in the 
presence of an active attentional set. Thus, these studies offer a possible appealing resolution to the 
attentional capture debate in that they show that attentional capture is initiated only in virtue of the 
intrinsic properties of the stimuli; it is only later that the attention allocation system adapts by 
learning to ignore stimuli that, given the current priority of the observers, are irrelevant. 
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Nonetheless, in contrast with all these findings, Theeuwes (1992) showed that during a 
visual search task a color singleton distractor interfered with search performance, and distractor 
interference did not show any significant reduction in function of stimulus experience (early, middle, 
late section of task performance) – although there was the suggestion of a decrease from the first 
to the second section. Theeuwes concluded from this persistent interference that attentional 
capture by highly salient color contrasts is otherwise top-down impenetrable.   
 
II. Experience as frequent exposure to the distractor 
Recently, a growing number of studies has begun to address the role of distractor experience by 
manipulating the frequency of distractor occurrence across blocks. 
Representative evidence of the phenomenon comes from Neo and Chua (2006) who showed 
that when a cue pre-signaled the target location, an abrupt onset retained the ability to capture 
attention when it occurred rarely in a given block of trials (18% or 25% of the trials), and, 
accordingly, caused interference in the concurrent task. However, such interference was strongly 
attenuated when it occurred frequently (i.e., in almost every trial). Similar to Turatto and Pascucci’s 
findings, this study confirms that abrupt onsets are able to divert attention even when observers 
have an active attention set, nevertheless, such ability is modulated by the degree with which 
observers are exposed to them, indicating that their processing is not mandatory. 
Having found this frequency effect, Folk and Remington (2015) challenged the contingent 
capture theory. They speculated that distraction is prevented not only when observers know exactly 
what to search for, but also when they have information about the distractor. Thus, in conditions in 
which there is the possibility to develop a positive set for the target properties, frequent 
presentation of a distractor stimulus (as opposed to infrequent presentation) is critical for 
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generating a set that includes the irrelevant properties to avoid, and hence prevent distraction 
efficiently. 
Interestingly, Muller and coworkers (Muller, Geyer; Zehetleitner & Krummenacher, 2009) 
demonstrated the frequency effect by gradually varying the proportion of distractor present trials 
across blocks; on one hand, they found that after an initial practice block in which distractors were 
never presented (0%), the distractor interference in the subsequent experimental block decreased 
when the probability of distractor occurrence increased (20% -->  50% --> 80%). On the other hand, 
after a practice session in which distractors appeared in every trial (100%), the distractor 
interference in the experimental phase did not vary with distractor probability (80% --> 50% --> 
20%). Following these observations, the authors suggested that the persistence of distraction 
demonstrated in Theeuwes’ study (1992) might have indicated that distractor interference cannot 
be down-modulated below some minimum value but not that attentional capture by color 
singletons is top-down impenetrable. Indeed, in Theeuwes’s study, participants were exposed to an 
initial practice block with a distractor in each trial, and so they might have learned to reject the 
distractor as much as possible. Thus, in the subsequent experimental block, where, again, a 
distractor always appeared, observers could not further reduce the distractor interference. 
However, in Muller et al.’s view, this interference value indicated only the end of a continuum of top-
down attentional control, and theoretically, the magnitude of this interference would have been 
greater if distractors had been presented in only a small, as compared to a large, proportion of trials 
within blocks. 
It is worth noting that the frequency effect has also been demonstrated in the field of the 
“perceptual load theory”. According to this theory, attentional capture depends strictly on the 
perceptual load of the task at hand: distractors capture attention, and therefore interfere with 
performance, only when there are enough attentional resources for processing other stimuli beyond 
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those that are task-relevant (see Lavie, 2005 for a review). Numerous studies have supported this 
theory by manipulating the perceptual load task (i.e., by increasing the number of different-identity 
items that need to be perceived, or by making the perceptual identification of the same number of 
items more demanding) and have found a distractor interference effect under low perceptual load 
conditions but not under high perceptual load conditions. Given that the load effect has also been 
shown for abruptly appearing distractors (Cosman & Vecera, 2009) and distractors that move or 
loom (Cosman & Vecera, 2010a), the perceptual load studies gave some compelling evidence that 
attentional capture is not automatic. Interestingly, Cosman and Vecera (2010a, b) support and 
challenge this conclusion in part, by showing that abrupt onset distractors interfere with task 
performance even in high perceptual load conditions when they represent rare events, but not 
when they are frequent. These findings corroborate the idea that experience with salient distractors 
is necessary for preventing its attentional capture, and the high perceptual load by itself is not 
sufficient.   
Evidence that frequency of presentation modulates attentional capture has been robustly 
reported using a variety of paradigms, with irrelevant abrupt onsets, highly salient color contrasts 
and, recently, moving object distractors (Folk & Remington, 2015; Geyer et al., 2008; Marini, 
Chelazzi & Maravita, 2013; Marini, Demeter, Roberts, Chelazzi & Woldorff, 2016; Muller et al., 2009; 
Neo & Chua, 2006; Pascucci & Turatto, 2015; Retell, Becker & Remington, 2016; Turatto & Pascucci, 
2016). In short, these reports underscore the effect that distractor frequency exerts on attentional 






III. Cognitive mechanisms of distractor rejection   
Previous studies converge to indicate that repeated or frequent exposure to the same stimulus are 
determinant for learning to reject irrelevant salient distractors. How does the brain prevent the 
reiterated counterproductive distractions? 
Over the years, numerous authors have noticed that the reduction of the interference effect 
with stimulus exposure strictly resembles the habituation of the orienting response. The 
phenomenon of habituation occurs for virtually all behavioral responses, from a simple muscle 
response to a complex exploratory behavior, and it is operationally "a response decrement as a 
result of repeated stimulation" (Harris, 1943). Given that it is widespread among all living creatures, 
from amoeba to humans, it is considered the simplest and most basic form of experience-
dependent plasticity (Thompson, 2009; Rankin et al., 2009). 
As early as 1963, Sokolov demonstrated that habituation is also a defining feature of the orienting 
response (OR). The orienting response is a collection of autonomic and cortical modifications that 
are elicited by environmental changes, such as the appearance of a novel, unexpected, or significant 
event. Although the functional significance of the OR is still debated, there is a consensus that it 
serves to direct attention to a stimulus in order to enhance its processing and prepare a prompt 
behavioral response. From an evolutionary perspective, a rapid detection of an environmental 
change is critical because it may represent a potentially dangerous (e.g., predator) or beneficial 
(e.g., mate) event for the organism’s survival. At the same time, when an innocuous event occurs 
repeatedly, the OR to it habituates because it is unnecessary to continue to enhance its processing. 
The investigation of the OR started with Pavlov (1927) who, by attempting to demonstrate 
conditioning to visiting colleagues, noticed that the dog did not attend to the relevant conditioned 
stimulus as it always did, but instead directed its attention to the unfamiliar visitor. The set of 
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behavioral changes in which the animal's receptor organs (eyes, ears, etc.) were oriented toward 
the novel stimulus was defined as an "investigatory reaction" and, later, "orienting reflex" or more 
colloquially the "what is it response". Subsequently, Sokolov noted that a novel event induced a 
series of physiological changes in the body– such as changes in the skin conductance level, and in 
the heart rate, as well as in the alpha blocking of the electroencephalogram (EEG) – that he named, 
indeed, “orienting response” (OR); these changes were gradually inhibited with stimulus repetition 
(habituation phenomenon), that is, as the stimulus became more familiar. From these physiological 
observations, Sokolov developed one of the most influential models of habituation: the Stimulus-
Model Comparator theory. The basic notion is that repeated exposure to a certain stimulus forms a 
“neural” model in the cerebral cortex, which represents events in the environment at any given 
instant. In addition, there is an amplifying system in the midbrain region that subserves the 
behavioral output. When the environment changes (e.g., a novel stimulus appears suddenly), the 
cortical representation - which includes the stimulation from this new stimulus - fails to match the 
neuronal model, and an OR - mediated by the amplifying system - is elicited toward it. After several 
repetitions, the stimulus model develops and gradually integrates the novel stimulus, and it exerts 
increasing inhibition to the amplifying system, thus yielding habituation of the OR. 
Besides the physiological changes, Horstmann (2002, 2005) showed that a novel, unexpected color 
stimulus also induced a slowing down of search times, a phenomenon that he called surprise 
capture. He concluded that surprise capture was triggered by a mismatch between the color of the 
object and the observers’ expectation regarding the color of the stimulus. The sensitivity of the 
attentional allocation system to a mismatch is similar to the neural model of Sokolov. 
Coming back to the mechanisms that underline the effect of distractor repetition and distractor 
frequency, several studies posit that both these effects reflect a form of stimulus novelty in 
Sokolovian terms (e.g., Folk & Remington, 2015; Muller et al., 2009; Neo & Chua, 2006; Turatto & 
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Pascucci, 2016), similar to surprise capture. Within this perspective, as observers implicitly learn 
about the sequence of events that make up each trial during an experiment, an internal 
representation of how a typical trial should unfold over time is soon established (a sort of neural 
model). During its first few repetitions, or if it occurs rarely over a block of trials, a distractor is not 
likely to be incorporated into the representation and it attracts attention because it violates the 
observer’s expectations. On the other hand, when the salient distractor is repeated several times or 
occurs frequently (i.e., in almost every trial) it is integrated into the representation, and fails to 
capture attention as a result of habituation. Thus, attentional capture adaptively decreases with 
stimulus exposure because further stimulus intake is not necessary, and a reiterated distraction 
could be dangerous for the organism’s survival. 
In parallel, several studies have given some indication that the effect of distractor exposure 
cannot be exclusively explained by the Sokolovian account (Folk & Remington, 2015, Marini et al., 
2013; Muller et al., 2009). A clear evidence has been recently provided by Turatto and collaborators 
(2018), who showed that a prior passive exposure to a repeating visual onset was sufficient to 
attenuate the onset interference when presented within the context of an active task, but such 
exposure was not enough to eliminate it. Critically, the interference disappeared rapidly during the 
task, suggesting that an active top-down mechanism was specifically engaged in order to inhibit the 
distractor information and shield target processing from interference.  
Conforming to these findings, in post hoc analyses, Folk and Remington (2015) showed that the 
magnitude of the interference of a rare onset was not modulated by the time interval between 
consecutive onset presentations. Theoretically, a system designed to detect unexpected stimuli or 
environmental changes should be sensitive to an infrequent onset only when the interval separating 
successive presentations is sufficiently long that the event is not integrated into the neural model, 
and so is generally unexpected. Accordingly, it has been demonstrated that the orienting reflex is 
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sensitive to the temporal spacing between the occurrence of successive stimuli (ISI) (Romero & 
Polich, 1996; Polich, 1990). Considering that distractor inhibition is effortful, the authors suggested 
that the reduction of distractor interference reflects an adaptive inhibition strategy; in a context in 
which distracting stimuli are rare it would be inefficient to set attention so that distractor 
interference is reduced in a few trials at the expense of the majority of trials. On the other hand, 
when distractors occur frequently it is crucial to inhibit them in order to avoid a deterioration of 
performance in almost every trial, and hence an overall reduction in task efficiency. 
Although the strategic suppression account has been supported by other studies (e.g., Muller et al., 
2009), interestingly none of these studies rules out the role of stimulus novelty completely. For 
instance, in the study by Muller and collaborators (2009), participants started with extensive 
practice in a visual search task in which a distractor color singleton appeared in every trial, and then 
performed an experimental block in which a singleton distractor was presented in almost every trial 
(80%). Critically, in the distractor-present trials, the distractor was defined by a frequent feature in 
70% of the trials (e.g., red singleton) and with a rare feature in 10% of the trials (e.g., blue singleton 
or bright singleton). Although participants gained experience with salient task-irrelevant stimuli and 
were incentivized to adopt a suppressive strategy in order to inhibit the too-frequent distractors, 
only the interference of the frequent feature was eliminated while the rare feature continued to 
cause a large interference effect. Thus, the rare distracting feature captured attention in a 
mandatory manner in virtue of its novelty and unexpectedness, while attention to the frequent 
familiar feature was inhibited as the result of a stimulus-specific habituation process. The notion of 
stimulus specificity is consistent with the notion that the habituation of the OR serves to reduce 
attention to innocuous stimuli while still leaving the organism responsive to novel stimuli. 
 Overall, all the studies converge toward the conclusion that the experience effect is 
mediated by the combination of stimulus novelty and the suppressive strategy. Is there a different 
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mechanism from the habituation of the OR that underlies the attenuation of distraction? In other 
words, are we able to ignore salient task-irrelevant stimuli even if novel and unexpected? 
 
1.3.1.2. Extensive experience (practice) with variable distractors 
Until now, the majority of the studies presented above provide evidence for a modulation of the 
attentional capture phenomenon due to an exposure to the same salient task-irrelevant stimulus, 
making it difficult to disambiguate whether a different mechanism from the habituation of the OR 
could subtend the attenuation of distraction. Overall, they suggest that a specific experience, or 
practice, with a given distractor promotes a stimulus-specific learning process (e.g., the colored 
distractor seen during the previous practice session) rather than general learning to reject task-
irrelevant stimuli (e.g., a general color feature or singleton items). 
With this consideration in mind, more thorough investigations have begun into the conditions under 
which the learned control over distractors can generalize to new conditions. Starting from the 
evidence that other high-specific forms of learning - such as skill learning - generalize to novel 
environments when practice is variable (Schmidt & Bjork, 1992), attentional studies have 
analogously examined whether attentional capture is similarly affected by extensive practice with 
variable distractors. That is, if we are trained to ignore distractors, are we able to subsequently 
reject a distractor that has never been seen before? This issue is relatively new and less 
investigated. 
 The first evidence that distractor rejection can generalize beyond the specific ignored 
stimulus came from the work of Dixon, Ruppel, Pratt & De Rosa (2009). In their study, participants 
were asked to identify which one of a pair of objects belonged to a previously defined target set. 
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During priming blocks, subject had to repeatedly attend to the stimulus color in order to identify 
targets (e.g., pink target and purple distractors), while ignoring the uninformative shape 
information. During the following probe blocks, subjects were otherwise required to attend to the 
shape of the stimuli (e.g., differentiate a cross target from triangle distractors) while ignoring the 
color. Interestingly, participants were not only slower to respond to the shapes in the probe blocks 
after the priming blocks but, critically, a larger decrement in performance was found when the 
shapes were previously ignored across multiple-color target contexts, compared to a single-color-
target context, indicating a generalized rejection strategy from a specific item (e.g., a circle) to a 
feature (e.g., shape). 
 More importantly for the focus of this thesis, two subsequent studies demonstrated a 
generalization of the practice effect when presented with salient distracting stimuli that were 
perceptually decoupled from the relevant stimulus rather than in response to irrelevant features 
belonging to the to-be-attended-to object (Kelley & Yantis, 2009; 2010; Vatterott, Mozer, & Vecera, 
2018). These studies used paradigms consisting in an initial training phase in which participants 
practised rejecting salient distractors and a test phase in which distractors were presented that had 
not been previously presented in the training session. 
 Using an additional singleton paradigm, Vatterott and collaborators (2018) showed that a 
variable practice session with different color singleton distractors that appeared intermixed in the 
same block (heterogeneous training) was effective in preventing the interference effect of a novel 
color singleton during the subsequent test phase. In contrast, practice with distinct color distractors 
presented separately within each block (homogeneous training) was not sufficient, and the 
interference effect recovered immediately when a novel color distractor appeared after the training 
session. The authors suggest that participants learn to reject distractors by implicitly building a 
distractor template, and the more variable the practice the broader the “tuning” to distractor 
26 
 
features, allowing a generalization of the distractor rejection strategy to novel irrelevant, but 
otherwise salient, stimuli (see also Won & Geng, 2018). 
 Regarding the target template, these results shed light on how attentional mechanisms 
involved in target selection and distractor rejection are differently affected by stimulus experience, 
suggesting that distractor rejection is mediated by separate processes. In fact, while variable 
distractor practice generates a broadly-tuned, less precise distractor template, that increases target 
search efficiency by generalizing to distractors that have not been experienced, practice with 
variable target features results in a broad target template that increases the number of false 
positive target selections, and hence reduces search performance. 
 In addition to previous findings, Kelley and Yantis (2009, 2010) used highly variable (never 
repeated) figure ground images that appeared in a completely irrelevant spatial position with 
respect to the central task, and demonstrated that variable practice is also effective in reducing 
attentional capture by novel, perceptual complex images. Given the perceptual complexity of the 
distracting stimuli, Kelley and Yantis (2009) hypothesized that the reduction in the distractor effect 
and the transfer to new spatial positions was the result of an improvement in the allocation of 
attention more than a habituation of the orienting response. Specifically, they proposed that 
distractor rejection requires the inhibition of the cortical areas corresponding to the representation 
of the object or to its spatial position. When the same distractor is repeated (as in homogenous 
practice), only a few areas need to be inhibited, and the process is quickly and constantly reinforced 
over time. On the other hand, when various and complex distractors are presented, different 
information is given over time, with the result that inhibitory interactions have to be established 
among a variety of visual processing areas. This broad filtering mechanism takes longer to be 
formed compared to specific filtering, but it can be applied in many different conditions. 
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 Besides evidence of the generalization of distractor learning rejection is still scarce and the 
underlying neural processes unknown, it is likely that this skill determines performance benefits in 
complex tasks, such as driving, where observers must quickly learn “what to attend to” and “what to 
ignore”. Thus, the studies reviewed above are crucial because the paradigms contained therein 
resemble typical real-life situations in which we are often intensely exposed to salient and complex 
stimuli that differ from each other regarding location of occurrence, physical appearance, and 
meaning. 
 
1.3.2. Integration and conclusion 
As discussed in the previous sections, several years of research on the control of visual attention has 
resulted in a wealth of information regarding the condition under which attention is involuntarily 
diverted by salient stimuli, as well as the extent to which such “capture” of attention is cognitively 
impenetrable, meaning that it is immune from modulation by top-down control.   
Investigation into the effect of distractor experience has been crucial in that it has offered a possible 
resolution to the attentional control debate. In accord with bottom-up theories, findings indicate 
that certain classes of events do have the intrinsic power to capture involuntary attention, but this 
capture is effectively prevented with repeated distractor exposure, indicating that it is not immune 
to top-down control, as supported by the top-down theories. 
Taken together, all these findings have been conceptualized in the “experience-mediated attentional 
tuning” framework of Vecera et al. (2014). As shown in Fig. 1.3, the authors suggest that the 
attentional control debate can be resolved by embracing the idea that stimulus-driven and goal-
directed control are not dichotomous processing modes; they lie on a continuum of processing in 
which experience and learning hold the balance of power by determining the extent to which 
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attention will be captured by stimuli or not. With less experience, attention is allocated in a 
stimulus-driven mode, but, when experience increases, attentional control becomes goal-directed 
(“learned control”). In this learned control view, bottom-up control is the default mode, but top-
down control is ultimately the most frequently used. Yet, although experience moves control from 
stimulus-driven to goal-driven, other factors might restrict the influence of experience, preventing 
control from becoming completely goal-driven, such as the perceptual load. For example, a task-
irrelevant distractor will continue to draw attention in tasks of low perceptual load, suggesting that 
attentional control cannot become completely goal-driven in such conditions and is unable to 






Figure 1.3. The “experience-based attentional tuning” framework. Modified from Vecera et al., 2014 
 
 
Thus, the experience-mediated attentional tuning explains daily life situations more satisfactorily; in 
fact, almost every day we hear about the dire consequences resulting from failure to remain 
concentrated on a given task in daily life (e.g., a car accident may occur if we do not pay careful 
attention to the road and to the traffic signs while driving) and we are conscious of how easily we 
get distracted by certain events despite severe consequences, yet, if we consider the huge amount 
of salient information and the sheer number of salient events that happen constantly around us 
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throughout our waking day, it is surprising how rare distraction is compared to what we may expect 




1.4. Attention and Emotion 
The attentional capture phenomenon has traditionally been associated with perceptual salience, 
which is computed on the basis of the detection of visual features that significantly differ in space 
(e.g., high color contrast, brightness, orientation) or over time (e.g., abrupt onset, motion) from the 
surrounding stimuli (Itti & Koch, 2001). Although these studies have provided an enhanced 
knowledge of the many facets of selective information processing, there are stimuli that are able to 
capture attention due to their emotional significance and despite their low-level physical properties. 
These stimuli are conditioned stimuli (i.e., stimuli that acquire a motivational value) and intrinsically 
motivational stimuli, such as images with an emotional content.  
  From an evolutionary perspective, the detection of potential opportunities and dangers are 
critical for the survival of individuals and their progeny, and environments in which those significant 
stimuli are unpredictable in time and space foster the evolution of mechanisms for attending to 
them reflexively, and responding rapidly if necessary. Thus, in a similar way to animals that 
selectively respond to stimuli on the basis of their inner motivation – such as hunger, threat of harm 
and sexual needs – human attention tends to be preferentially allocated to emotional/motivational 
events rather than to those that are routine and neutrally affective (Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert,1997). 
With a reference to its natural state, this form of attention is referred to as “motivated attention”. 
  In the laboratory, the occurrence of an emotional cue sets off a cascade of brain responses. 
Several studies suggest that emotional stimuli engage cortico-limbic appetitive and defensive 
circuits, which, in turn, (i)  enhance attention allocation to facilitate the perceptual and evaluative 
processing of the stimulus, and (ii) trigger a series of reflex responses to prepare the organism for 
action (Anderson, Laurent & Yantis, 2011; Gottlieb, 2012; Hickey, Chelazzi & Theeuwes, 2010; Lang 
& Bradley, 2010; Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1997; LeDoux, 2012; Pourtois, Schettino & Vuilleumier, 
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2013; Raymond & O'Brien, 2009). Engagement of these systems is mediated by stimulus 
significance, which is computed in terms of valence – indicating which system is activated – and 
arousal – indicating variation in the “intensity” of the activation (e.g., Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert 
& Lang, 2001). 
 
1.4.1. Attentional capture by conditioned stimuli 
Findings regarding the influence of emotional stimuli on attentional control come primarily from 
animal and human research using conditioned stimuli. Specifically, stimuli that have acquired an 
emotional significance (motivational value) through an association with a reward or punishment are 
suggested to be automatically prioritized by the attentional allocation system (e.g., for a review see 
Failing & Theeuwes, 2018; Le Pelley, Mitchell, Beesley, George & Wills, 2016). Evidence of this is 
shown in numerous studies that report performance benefits when the stimulus signaling reward or 
threat are either the target or relevant for task-performance (e.g., bound to the spatial location of 
the target). For example, in Kiss, Driver and Eimer (2009), participants were rewarded for searching 
for a singleton whose color signaled the magnitude of the reward that could be obtained. Although 
the color singleton varied trial by trial, meaning that participants were uncertain about the incoming 
reward until the target was presented, the results showed faster identification for high-rewarded 
targets than for low-rewarded targets, suggesting that reward modulates the efficacy of top-down 
control. 
 However, the powerful capacity that conditioned stimuli have to attract attention has been 
clearly shown by studies in which reward or threat-signaling stimuli compete with other attentional 




demonstrating that conditioned stimuli capture attention independently of our control has been 
designed by Le Pelley and collaborators (2015). In a version of the additional singleton task 
(Theeuwes, 1992), participants searched for a shape singleton while ignoring a color singleton that 
appeared in two thirds of the trials. The critical manipulation was that the singleton was presented 
throughout the experiment in three different colors and each color signaled a different amount of 
reward that could be earned if participants gave a correct response within a given time limit. 
Crucially, the stimulus that signaled a reward was never required to be selected in order to obtain 
the reward and, more importantly, its selection could determine a slowing down of responses and 
hence the consequent loss of the reward. Nevertheless, the results showed that response times 
were slower when the color distractor was present compared to when it was absent, and the 
degree of attentional capture was larger when the distractor signaled a high reward compared to a 
low reward - ruling out the possibility that attentional capture was due only to distractor salience. 
Moreover, distractors signaling a high reward produced a large oculomotor capture, indexed by 
saccade latencies, compared to low-reward distractors. Considering that participants were not 
explicitly informed of the relationship between distractor color and reward magnitude, these 
findings demonstrate that conditioned stimuli capture involuntary covert and overt attention even 
when they are entirely irrelevant for the task and, more importantly, even when attending to them 
is counterproductive for obtaining the reward. 
Similarly, an automatic attentional and oculomotor capture has also been found for threat-
signaling distractors (e.g., Schmidt, Belopolsky & Theeuwes, 2015a,b; Nissens, Failing & Theeuwes, 
2017). For example, Nissens and co-workers (2017) found that participants attended to a threat-
signaling, but non-physically salient, distractor even though they had been warned that attending to 




Corroborating evidence has also been found using very different paradigms and with 
perceptually complex conditioned stimuli (Failing & Theeuwes, 2015; Reynolds & O’Brien, 2009), 
emphasizing the generalizability and universality of findings of attentional capture by conditioned 
stimuli. For example, Failing and Theeuwes (2015) found that participants’ sensitivity in detecting a 
target image (e.g., an image depicting a forest) among a fast-presented stream of different images 
(e.g., images of a field) decreased when a picture that had previously been associated with a reward 
was presented. Moreover, the semantic category of natural scenes associated with a high reward 
caused more interference in target detection than the semantic category associated with a low 
reward. A similar effect was found when using conditioning images associated with a loss of money, 
showing a decrement in target detection when an image previously associated with a high loss, 
compared to a small loss, preceded the target. 
Conjointly, these studies suggest that the extent to which attention is allocated to conditioned 
stimuli does not depend on the valence of the stimulus – that is, whether it is associated with a 
positive (reward) or a negative (threat or loss of money) value – but rather on its arousal, that is, the 
amount of reward or loss associated with the stimulus itself. 
 
1.4.2. Attentional capture by emotional images 
Differently from conditioned neutral images, natural scenes with an emotional content – such as 
erotic and violent images - are shown to have the intrinsic power to elicit measurable attention and 
orienting responses. Picture viewing is a ubiquitous human activity, and with the importance that 
the mass media has assumed, we are now, more than ever, continuously exposed to pictures 
through television, newspapers, billboards, or banner advertising on websites. Images that are 




though they are mere representations and not actual events, and their impact on our behavior is 
well-known in daily life. For example, just think how the movie “Jaws” caused a fear of swimming in 
the sea in a generation of people (Cantor, 2004) and that, recently, billboard advertisements for 
women's lingerie were removed from some main cities because they captured drivers’ attention, 
impacting negatively on road safety. 
 
1.4.2.1. Orienting in free picture viewing 
In the psychology laboratory, one very intriguing way in which attention has been linked to these 
emotional stimuli has been by highlighting analogies existing between the bodily changes that occur 
when individuals process these “significant” events and when they process “novel” events, which 
are the stimuli that were initially found to elicit an orienting and attentional response (Bradley, 
2009). 
  To evaluate these analogies empirically, stimulus “significance” has to be categorized in 
terms of subjective ratings of valence and arousal; specifically, when observers rate a set of pictures 
that depict a variety of common objects and daily life situations in terms of pleasure (ranging from 
pleasant to unpleasant) and arousal (ranging from calm to aroused), the result is a two-dimensional 
space like the one illustrated in Fig. 1.4a (e.g. Bradley, 2009). This distribution of pictures is 
consistent with the idea that judgments of their significance reflect the underlying activation of the 
motivational systems: when activation is minimal, pictures are rated as being low-arousing and are 
usually labeled “neutral” or “unemotional”, on the contrary, when the activation gradually increases, 
pictures are rated as more arousing, and are defined differently, as being “emotional”. From a 








Figure 1.4. A) On the left, this representation of the distribution of pictures in a two-dimensional space defined by mean rating of 
judged pleasure (y axis) and arousal (x axis) is consistent with the hypothesis that evaluative judgements reflect the level of activation 
in appetitive and defensive systems. Modified from Bradley (2009). On the right, examples of the picture categories rated by 
participants. Below, skin conductance changes (B) and Late positive potential amplitude (400-800 ms) elicited when repeatedly 
viewing the same pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant pictures through three blocks (habituation phase), and a novel set of emotional 





As stated in a previous paragraph (1.3.1.1), the orienting response is a collection of different 
physiological, neural and motor responses - including heart rate deceleration, skin conductance 
change and EEG activity - which were initially linked with attention allocation to novel, unexpected 
events. Hence, in order to appreciate the effect of the significance of a stimulus on the OR, it is 
useful to concentrate on the main findings derived from physiological studies in which participants 
passively viewed significant (arousing pleasant or unpleasant) pictures that were novel or repeated. 
Specifically, during the picture viewing paradigm, it has been found that: (i) all pictures elicit an OR 
during their initial presentation, hence when they are “novel” (i.e., never repeated, as in the 
Sokolovian sense of the word), (ii) the significance of the stimulus, both pleasant and unpleasant, 
increases the magnitude of the OR, and (iii) the different components of the OR habituate at 
different rates with repeated presentation of the same picture, suggesting that the OR is a complex 
combination of responses rather than a unitary process. With these findings as a starting point, 
evidence regarding the modulation of the main components of the OR will be described in a more 
exhaustive way in order to shed light on the extent to which emotion affects attention (Bradley, 
2009; Codispoti, Ferrari, De Cesarei & Cardinale, 2006). 
  Regarding the peripheral physiological components of the OR, when observers passively look 
at pictures, heightened skin conductance (Fig 1.4b) and relatively prolonged cardiac deceleration 
are elicited during the initial presentation, and this is true for all novel pictures including those that 
are neutral. The magnitude of these measures is affected by stimulus significance, showing an 
increased skin conductance response and a more pronounced heart rate deceleration for 
emotional, compared to neutral pictures. However, the pattern of the affective modulation for the 
two components is different, with a larger skin conductance for both pleasant and unpleasant, 
compared to neutral pictures; a larger heart rate deceleration, on the other hand, is seen for 




  Concerning the neural physiological components of the OR, different event-related potential 
(ERP) components are modulated by stimulus novelty, such as an early mismatch negativity 
(Naatanen, 1979) and the later N2b and P3a (e.g., Courchesne, Hillyard & Galambos, 1975; 
Rohrbeaugh, 1984). Several other ERPs are modulated by stimulus significance, including the 
centro-parietal P3b that is especially tied to the attentional allocation to task-relevant stimuli, and a 
similar slow positive centro-parietal component called Late Positive Potential (LPP; Cacioppo, Crites, 
Gardner & Berntson, 1994). As shown in Fig. 1.4c, similar to the skin conductance response, 
pleasant and unpleasant pictures elicit a more pronounced LPP compared with neutral pictures; the 
LPP magnitude does not differ between pleasant and unpleasant pictures. This modulatory effect, 
that is referred to as affective modulation of the LPP, has been reported in numerous studies and it 
is considered a reliable index of attention allocation and emotional significance and, for the aims of 
this study I will subsequently describe it in more detail. 
These components habituate at different rates. For example, changes in electrodermal 
activity disappear when the same neutral images are presented after a week, while emotional 
images continue otherwise to elicit a larger orienting. However, when pictures are consecutively 
repeated within and across-blocks of trials, the skin conductance response does not discriminate 
between emotional and neutral pictures after approximately 20 repetitions. On the other hand, the 
general prolonged cardiac orienting to pictures, and the specific differences in heart rate change 
found for unpleasant pictures, disappear both when the same images are presented after a week 
and when they are repeated about 10 times. Although skin conductance and heart rate changes 
disappear completely with picture repetitions, a new set of pictures elicits the reinstatement of 
both these changes when presented after the habituation process. 
In contrast, although the overall LPP amplitude decreases with stimulus repetition, the affective 




diminish, neither when the same emotional images are repeated after a week nor when they are 
repeated numerous times within the same block or for subsequent blocks, remaining invariant for 
up to 90 image repetitions (Fig. 1.5c) (Bradley, Lang & Cuthbert, 1993; Codispoti et al., 2006). Thus, 
heart rate habituates faster compared to skin conductance, while the affective modulation of the 
LPP seems to be unaffected by habituation. Taken together, these data indicate that the traditional 
indices (heart rate, skin conductance, and LPP) are differently modulated by repetition and stimulus 
significance, suggesting that they might reflect different facets of orienting. Nonetheless, all the 
components of the OR work jointly to promote the survival of the organism by directing its 
attention, thus alerting it, to unusual events that might be potentially relevant (e.g., a potential 
predator from which it is necessary to escape or a mating partner that it is beneficial to approach). 
The survival function of the OR is easily appreciable in conditioned contexts, in which novel 
stimuli are associated with electric shocks or money, however, it is not so readily perceivable in the 
classic repetition/change paradigms where novel stimuli are neither clearly motivational nor 
completely novel. Novelty may be defined in several ways, and distinct types of stimuli have been 
considered novel. In reality, a stimulus is truly novel only when it has never been experienced 
before, and when it does not match with any long-term memory representations. This kind of 
novelty is difficult to study in human adults since most, if not all, stimuli used in laboratory 
experiments are “familiar”, even when presented to the participants for the first time, given that 
they will at least bear some resemblance to something that has been experienced during the course 
of life. It is worth noting that some indication as to the effect of viewing a truly novel stimulus is 
provided by studies on non-human primates; these studies found that the initial reactions were 
always defensive and protective, even though the stimuli used were inoffensive, and sometimes 
inanimate, objects (Dolin, Zborovskaya, Zamakhovev, 1965). Novel stimuli reflexively engage the 




intake and attention, and a subsequent enhancement of skin conductance to prepare the organism 
for action when the stimulus represents a real danger. Only after information is stored regarding the 
safety of the stimulus are traditional “orienting” behaviors of exploration actualized. As suggested in 
animal literature, this selective habituation – “learn what not to fear” – is the most conservative and 
advantageous strategy that animals can pursue, since they approach, sniff, and handle the novel 
stimulus only after answering the questions “What is that?” and “What should I do?”. This behavior 
therefore saves their life when the stimulus is effectively dangerous, such as a predator, entailing the 
cost of losing a meal or a mating opportunity when the stimulus is ultimately appetitive. 
  A different way to study novelty in human adults is by considering stimulus novelty as in the 
Sokolovian account in which a stimulus is novel when it does not match the representations that are 
currently active in the short-term memory (STM) –  Sokolov’s “neuronal model”. In the laboratory, a 
short-term aspect of novelty is deviance; this term is applied to a rare stimulus change (i.e., deviant) 
that occurs in an otherwise repetitive sequence (i.e., standard). In this case, the conspicuous 
repeated presentations of the standard result in a strong match in the STM with little evidence of 
orienting in skin conductance, heart rate, or LPP (e.g., Simons, Graham, Miles & Balaban, 1998; 
Simons, Rockstroh, Elbert & Fiorito, 1987), while the infrequent occurrence of the deviant - and the 
long lapse between its consecutive occurrence - decreases the probability of a match, and increases 
the OR response as a consequence (e.g., Escera and Malmierca, 2014; Gatchel & Lang, 1974). 
Alternatively, the stimulus can be novel when it is presented only once and never repeated within 
the experiment, therefore becoming less easily identified or categorized. In terms of ERPs, for 
instance, it is found that in oddball paradigms the orienting response is enhanced for novel (i.e., 
never repeated rare changes) compared to deviant stimuli (i.e., the same rare change) (Courchesne 
et al., 1975), and behavioral data show that, compared to a standard distractor, participants are 




that more attentional resources are diverted to novel stimuli (e.g., Schomaker and Meeter, 2014). 
According to the mismatch model (Sokolov, 1963), these findings suggest that the degree to which 
stimuli elicit an orienting response depends on their degree of novelty that, in turn, depends on the 
degree of similarity between the stimulus features and the current STM representations. Thus, 
orienting will be largest for stimuli that do not share features with STM representations (i.e., novel 
stimuli) compared to stimuli with a low featural match (i.e., deviant stimuli), and will be minimal for 
stimuli with substantial overlapping features (i.e., standard stimuli). This continuum can be similarly 
proposed for the long-term memory (LTM) representation with the largest OR to truly novel stimuli 
and no OR for extremely familiar stimuli.   
  As far as emotional pictures are concerned, both pleasant and unpleasant images match 
existing representations in LTM to some extent, even when presented for the first time during 
picture viewing paradigms. For example, a picture of an attacking dog that has never been seen 
before matches a LTM representation of previously seen dangerous dogs. Unpleasant pictures 
match existing associations with the defensive motivational system that, as previously described for 
truly novel stimuli, initiates increased perceptual processing (cardiac deceleration) and preparation 
for action (skin conductance change), because past memories lead us to consider the unpleasant 
stimulus as dangerous. Pleasant pictures, on the other hand, include associations with the 
appetitive motivational system and, though novel, are considered potentially non-threatening or 
even rewarding, generating a reduced cardiac deceleration and a heightened skin conductance 
change inducing the approach tendency (Lang, 1984). Through their natural associations with 
motivational systems, pleasant and unpleasant familiar pictures prompt a similar enhanced late 
positive potential, whose magnitude is presumed to reflect both the allocation of attentional 
resources to these stimuli and the activation of the motivational system. Considering that the 




that the repetition of the same emotional images does not eliminate the associative connection 
with the motivational systems (e.g., Rescorla, 2001), but reduces the necessity of an enhanced 
perceptual processing and/or of an immediate reaction - as indicated by the rapid habituation of the 
heart rate and skin conductance change, respectively. 
  In summary, the different components of the OR mediate different adaptive reactions to 
novel and significant events, and therefore their habituation rate can be considered a reliable “tool” 
for examining the state of engagement of their subtended processes (Bradley, 2009). 
 
1.4.2.2. The Late Positive Potential (LPP) 
Event-related potentials (ERPs) are modulations of the electrical activity of the brain, which are 
traditionally analyzed in terms of components, defined as deflections of the ERP wave occurring at a 
certain latency. Thanks to its excellent temporal resolution, the ERP technique is quickly becoming 
the primary tool in cognitive neuroscience, providing a reliable narration of neural processes as they 
unfold, millisecond by millisecond. 
In terms of ERPs, it has been observed that the viewing of emotional content affects the 
amplitude of a late slow positive potential during a passive picture viewing, named the Late Positive 
Potential (LPP). As shown in Fig. 1.5, the LPP is an enhanced centroparietal positive signal that 
begins around 300 – 400 ms after the onset of emotional, compared to neutral, pictures, and that 
persists after the disappearance of the image for up to 6 s. This cortical modulatory effect seems to 
be greater for pictures rated highest in emotional arousal, compared to low-arousing images, 




al., 1994; Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley, Birbaumer & Lang, 2000; Schupp et al., 2000; Schupp, Flaish, 
Stockburger & Junghöfer , 2006; Schupp, Junghöfer , Weike & Hamm, 2004).   
 
Figure 1.5. Example of the emotional modulation of the LPP during Picture Free Viewing. 
 
Crucially, the affective modulation of the LPP does not rely on voluntary evaluation of the 
hedonic content and is relatively unaffected by task demands; for example, Cuthbert et al. (1995) 
found a similar modulation when comparing the magnitude of the LPP elicited during passive 
viewing to when an evaluative task was performed, suggesting that passive viewing elicits similar 
cortical processing to that elicited by an explicit evaluative task. Moreover, several behavioral 
studies have found involuntary semantic processing of affective stimuli (McKenna & Sharma, 2004; 
Pratto & John, 1991; Stenberg, Wiking & Dahl, 1998), and have also discovered that affectively 




evaluative context (Bargh, Chen & Burrows, 1996; Giner-Sorolla, Garcìa, Bargh, 1999; Hermans, 
Houwer & Eelen, 2001; Wentura, 1998). 
These results give rise to the idea that intrinsically motivational cues are selectively 
processed, because they naturally engage attentional resources, as reflected in the LPP modulation 
(Lang et al., 1997). 
Even more convincing evidence of the automaticity of emotional processing was provided by 
Codispoti and colleagues (Codispoti et al., 2006; Codispoti, Ferrari & Bradley, 2007; Ferrari, Bradley, 
Codispoti & Lang, 2011). In these studies, using a free viewing paradigm, the same picture was 
presented for as many as 90 trials within the same experimental session. The authors found that the 
overall amplitude of the LPP decreased to some extent with repetition, but, critically, the affective 
modulation of the LPP remained unvaried until the last picture presentation. The persistence of this 
cortical modulation, notwithstanding the massed repetitions, led the authors to interpret the 
emotional modulation of the LPP not only as an index of attentional allocation but also of 
motivational engagement. This hypothesis was supported by a further study that found an 
enhanced LPP even when pictures were presented for only 25 ms that persisted for seconds after 
the picture itself was no longer on the screen, ruling out the possibility that it reflected a continuing 
perusal of the sensory array (Codispoti, Mazzetti & Bradley, 2009). 
Over the years, numerous findings have converged to indicate that the LPP component 
reflects the emotional processing of the semantic properties of the pictures, rather than the 
perceptual properties (Codispoti, Bradley & Lang, 2001; Codispoti, De Cesarei & Ferrari, 2012; De 
Cesarei and Codispoti, 2006; 2011). For example, it has been intuitively proposed that both color 
and picture size could facilitate the recognition of the emotional content of a natural image under 




a similar modulation of the LPP was found for color and greyscale images regardless of the very brief 
image presentation (24 ms) (Codispoti et al., 2012), and was not dampened by picture size 
reduction (De Cesarei and Codispoti, 2006). Moreover, when progressively revealing the content of 
initially degraded pictures by manipulating the spatial filtering effects of the image, the affective 
modulation of the LPP varied with picture identification similarly for low- and high-pass filtered 
pictures, and hence is not affected by the compositional content of the image itself (De Cesarei and 
Codispoti, 2011). Taken together these findings rule out the possibility that LPP affective modulation 
is merely due to bottom-up perceptual factors. 
In light of all these findings, the affective modulation of the LPP is considered to be an index 
of the semantic identification of motivationally significant pictures, and of the activation of 
motivational systems, and it is not due to mere perceptual factors, such as exposure time, color, 
picture size or spatial frequencies (Ferrari et al., 2011; Lang et al., 1997; Schupp et al., 2006). 
 
1.4.2.3.  Emotion counteracting top-down processes 
In the studies reviewed in the previous section, attention to emotional cues was examined in a free-
viewing context in which the emotional content of the pictures was the most salient aspect of the 
stimulus to process (e.g., Bradley, 2009). In this type of situation, orientation of attention toward 
emotional images has been associated with several autonomic changes, such as the increase in skin 
conductance. In everyday life, however, it rarely happens that we monitor the environment 
passively; more often than not we are engaged in a task. How is attention allocation affected when 
attending to an emotional stimulus is counterproductive for performing the task at hand? In other 




attentional resources that can be committed to the evaluation of affective stimuli is constrained, do 
motivationally salient distractors compete with task-relevant stimuli for attentional selection? 
  As discussed in previous paragraphs, attentional capture by a perceptually salient stimulus is 
traditionally measured in terms of the detrimental effect that it causes on the concurrent task, such 
as the elongation of reaction times and/or increment in errors. In a similar way, research has 
converged in showing that emotional pictures engage attentional resources, causing a poorer 
processing of the task, and hence worsened performance. For instance, a classic paradigm adopted 
to demonstrate the emotional attentional capture is the one adopted by Erthal and collaborators 
(2005) in which participants had to discriminate the orientation of two bars that appeared on the 
left and right sides of a simultaneously-presented central picture. Although the pictures were task-
irrelevant, and participants were required to ignore them, authors found slower response times 
when high-arousal unpleasant scenes, compared to neutral scenes, appeared. A similar disruption in 
a simple discrimination task has also been demonstrated using high-arousal pleasant pictures (e.g., 
Gupta et al., 2016). The emotional interference effect is measured as the quantitative difference 
between the disruption caused by pictures with an emotional meaning compared to pictures with a 
neutral meaning. Importantly, Calvo and collaborators (Calvo, Gutiérrez-García & del Libano, 2015) 
demonstrated that emotional images still caused an interference effect when the low-level 
perceptual properties between neutral and emotional pictures were controlled, confirming that the 
emotional attentional capture phenomenon is determined by the semantic picture content, rather 
than by mere bottom-up factors. Moreover, the authors found that emotional pictures interfere 





  Further evidence of the emotional prioritization is provided by studies in which attentional 
resources are temporally constrained. One of the most often used methods of examining temporal 
attention involves the attentional blink phenomenon (AB; Chun & Potter, 1995; Raymond, Shapiro & 
Arnell, 1992). In an AB task, participants are exposed to a stream of stimuli in which each stimulus is 
only briefly presented, and they are required to detect or discriminate between the identity of two 
consecutive targets embedded in the stream. Typically, the attentional blink consists in a poorer 
performance for the second target (T2) when it appears very soon after the target that was 
previously attended to (200 ms versus 800 ms), because of the limits of available attentional 
resources across time (e.g., Shapiro, Raymond & Arnell, 1997). Interestingly, it is found that the AB 
effect is modulated by motivational significance, with enhanced accuracy in recognizing T2s at short 
intervals when they are emotionally-charged rather than neutral, suggesting that emotional stimuli 
gain priority in attentional processing regardless of the temporally constrained processing. It is 
fascinating to note that pleasant and unpleasant pictures capture and hold attention to an extent 
that they induce a “spontaneous AB”. Specifically, participants are worse at detecting target images 
that are presented after high-arousal pleasant and unpleasant pictures compared to neutral images, 
an effect that is operationalized as “emotion-induced blindness” (EIB) (e.g., Most, Chun, Widders & 
Zald, 2005; Most et al., 2007; Piech et al., 2011). Thus, in constrained conditions, emotional 
prioritization can lead to two opposing effects: on one hand, emotional stimuli behave as distractors 
that deteriorate the temporal processing of targets, and hence cause an AB, and on the other hand, 
emotional targets are empowered to overcome the AB. 
  Besides natural scenes, attentional capture by emotional stimuli has been observed in 
paradigms using faces and words, showing that angry or happy facial expressions and emotionally-
charged words interfere more with performance compared to neutral stimuli. The interference 




nonetheless they add evidence that intrinsically motivational stimuli enjoy a special status in the 
attentional allocation system. It is worth noting that, independently of the nature of the stimulus, 
attentional capture seems to be specifically sensitive to its arousal, independently of the valence. 
For example, when comparing stimuli rated with different levels of arousal, Calvo and colleagues 
(2015) found that the more unpleasant and pleasant images were arousing, the more performances 
in a perceptual task were impaired. Also, Keil and Ihssen (2004) confirmed these findings using an 
AB task; the authors observed that only pleasant and unpleasant words that were rated high in 
arousal overcame the AB, while low-arousing emotional stimuli behaved similarly to neutral stimuli. 
Comparable results are found for conditioned stimuli (section 1.4.4.1), in which stimuli associated 
with a high amount of reward or loss disrupt performance to a greater extent compared to stimuli 
associated with a low or zero amount, converging to indicate an attentional prioritization for high-
arousing stimuli. Recently, Padmala and co-workers (2018) have shown that the simultaneous 
presentation of two high-arousing distractors, independently of valence congruence (pleasant-
pleasant, unpleasant-unpleasant or pleasant-unpleasant), cause greater interference compared to 
one high-arousing emotional image associated with a neutral one, which, in turn, interfere more 
compared with the presentation of two neutral images. These data have been interpreted as a 
modulation of the emotional interference as a function of stimulus significance. Consequently, 
variation of the interference effect with stimulus arousal - indexed by reaction times and/or 
accuracy – might bear a close resemblance to the LPP and skin conductance components of the 
orienting response: in a free viewing context, in fact, viewing of the highest arousing pictures elicits 
the largest LPP and the most pronounced SC changes (Codispoti et al., 2006; Codispoti and De 
Cesarei, 2007; Johnston, 1986; Radilova, 1982; Schupp et al., 2004). Thus, behavioral measures that 




to be indexes of orienting, converge to suggest that the more a stimulus is arousing, and the more it 
engages motivational systems, the more it captures attention. 
  In summary, emotional interference effects have been demonstrated using a variety of visual 
and acoustic tasks (e.g., Calvo et al., 2015; Ferrari, Mastria, Bruno, 2014; Gupta, Hur & Lavie, 2016; 
Harris and Pashler, 2004; Hartikainen, Ogawa & Knight, 2000; Shimmack, 2005; Vuilleumier, Armony, 
Driver & Dolan, 2001) and all these findings have converged to indicate that emotional stimuli are 
prioritized by the attention allocation system in such a way that they are selected over task-relevant 
stimuli even when they are entirely irrelevant for the task in terms of spatial position, semantic 
content and sensory modality of presentation. Overall, the interference produced by emotional 
distractors has been interpreted as evidence that the processing of emotional stimuli is not only 
prioritized, but that it occurs in a fairly mandatory fashion (Vuilleumier et al., 2001) 
 
I.  To be or not to be (mandatorily attended) 
Recently, the hypothesis of an obligatory emotional processing has been challenged by findings 
which show that there are factors that are able to attenuate or even prevent the emotional 
interference effect. However, evidence does not converge toward a unique conclusion. 
One of the most fascinating pieces of evidence in support of a mandatory attentional 
capture by emotional stimuli is provided by Augst and collaborator (2014), demonstrating the 
incapability of individuals to voluntarily reject significant stimuli. Specifically, the authors showed 
that the presentation of emotional images always interfered during a simple discrimination task, 
even when participants were informed in advance as to what kind of distractor would appear in a 




demonstrates that the emotional interference effect disappears when individuals are rewarded to 
perform better in a task, indicating that emotional distractors can be voluntarily ignored when there 
is sufficient motivation to do so, and hence the processing of emotional stimuli is not obligatory 
(e.g., Padmala and Pessoa, 2014; Hu, Padmala & Pessoa, 2013). Overall, the hypothesis that 
attentional capture by emotional stimuli can be controlled by volitional, top-down control processes 
is still debatable. 
Another line of research that argues against an automatic attentional capture comes from 
the field of the perceptual load. On the whole, these studies indicate that emotional interference is 
not only reduced, but even eliminated, in those strict conditions in which not only emotional stimuli 
are task-irrelevant but also in which the main task requires a high level of perceptual load (e.g., 
Erthal et al., 2005; Mitchel et al., 2007; Pessoa, 2002; Silvert et al., 2007). For instance, in the study 
of Erthal et al. (2005), participants were presented a foveal image while simultaneously performing 
a discrimination-orientation task in which they were asked to decide whether two bars with an 
angular difference of 90° (low perceptual load condition) or 6° (high load condition) had the same or 
a different orientation. The results indicated that while emotional, compared to neutral, pictures 
slowed down response times in the low perceptual load condition, this interference effect 
disappeared in the high load condition. These findings are consistent with Lavie’s (1995; Lavie, Hirst, 
De Fockert & Viding, 2004) proposal that if the processing load of a target task exhausts available 
resources, stimuli that are irrelevant to the task will not be processed. Therefore, emotional 
processing is not mandatory because emotional stimuli can capture attention only when there are 
spare resources left from the processing of task-relevant information. 
Interestingly, a different panorama has been observed when the focus of investigation is not 




(2006) found that the modulation of LPP was unaffected by the load of the foveal task; in fact, 
peripheral emotional images elicited a more pronounced LPP compared to neutral stimuli in the low 
load condition, and this differential modulation still persisted in the high load condition, indicating 
that the emotional content of stimuli continued to be processed in the brain.
To summarize, emotional stimuli seem to be quite special in their ability to capture 
attention, engaging motivational systems and drawing attentional resources even under challenging 
conditions. As argued by Carretiè (2014), “from an evolutionary perspective, the fact that 
emotional, biologically salient distractors capture attention also during highly demanding tasks 
seems a reasonable strategy”. However, because human beings are not slaves to their instinct and 
reflexes, an intriguing issue is the extent to which it is possible to resist their distracting effect. Some 
evidence indicates that when capture becomes too detrimental for task performance – for example, 
obstructing the possibility of reaching an amount of money (Padmala and Pessoa, 2014; Hu et al., 
2013) - one can voluntarily ignore emotional distractors. Thus, an interesting question is whether 






1.4.3. Experience with emotional distractors 
Observations of animal behavior in natural environments have provided the most engaging evidence 
of the importance that experience and learning have in the perception of significant events. 
Considering that the “emotional attentional capture” phenomenon has been framed within an 
evolutionary perspective, it seems interesting to draw a brief parallel with animal research. 
  In the animal world, predation is a major force in shaping animal behaviors, so that precise 
identification of predators is beneficial for the survival of animals that serve as food for others. A 
predator image that is too specific leads to missed detections of predators - and hence poses a risk 
to life - but an over-general predator image generates fitness costs because animals waste time and 
energy responding to a harmless cue. In the absence of innate predator recognition, experience and 
learning allow prey animals to modify the image of a predator. As a result, prey can fine-tune anti-
predator behavior to match the current risk, and balance the cost of predator avoidance with 
fitness-promoting behaviors, such as foraging and mating, thus increasing both their survival and 
fitness (e.g., Lima & Dill, 1990; Lima & Bednekoff, 1999). Interestingly, it has been found that species 
that live in situations in which cues associated with predators are highly variable or change in time 
tend to respond to all the unfamiliar cues and ignore harmless ones only when, with experience, 
they have learned that they do not represent a danger. Evidence of this is especially appreciable in 
the modulation of the anti-predator response of seals to whales’ vocalizations. By reproducing 
sounds of different populations of predator and non-predator whales, Deecke and co-workers 
(2002) found that seals responded strongly to both familiar-predator whales that habitually prey on 
them, and to harmless whales that live in distant areas, and hence to cues with which they had no 
prior experience; on the contrary, they did not respond to harmless whales living in the same area 




image, interrupting their current foraging or mating activity to respond to all cues that could 
possibly be associated with a threat, but with experience, they remove harmless cues from the 
image, learning to ignore these significant, but otherwise inconsequential, stimuli. As a result, 
through a specific habituation process, they learn what not to fear. 
  In human beings, the effect of experience and learning on emotional attentional capture, as 
indexed by the behavioral interference effect, is still relatively unmapped. Regarding conditioned 
stimuli, for example, it has been shown that a stimulus that was previously associated with a reward 
initially captures attention despite being task-irrelevant and no longer associated with a reward, but 
this interference effect is larger in the first hundred trials and then diminishes gradually, indicating 
that as the learned stimulus-value associations are extinguished in the absence of a reward, so does 
attentional capture (Anderson et al., 2011). 
  Converging results have been found when investigating motivationally intrinsic stimuli. For 
example, Harris and Pashler (2004) clearly showed that an emotional word has a distracting effect in 
an unrelated concurrent task (“digit-parity task”) only initially when its appearance is unexpected. 
After a few repetitions, however, it becomes less distracting, and acts more similarly to neutral 
stimuli. Therefore, the authors conclude that emotional stimuli are not so special after all in their 
ability to attract attention, and the interference that they cause apparently reflects a momentary 
response of surprise that habituates very rapidly. 
  However, besides the behavioral interference effect, at a cortical level, the affective 
modulation of the LPP tells us another story. Although RTs are mostly used as measures of 
attentional capture by distractors, recently studies have begun to incorporate ERPs to examine the 
effect of stimulus repetition on emotional distraction. Contrasting evidence derives firstly from a 




2017). During explicit categorization tasks in which participants were presented a series of images 
(emotional and neutral) and were asked to categorize each of them according to a specified target 
(e.g., presence or absence of an animal), the authors found that pleasant and unpleasant images 
always elicited an enhanced LPP regardless of picture repetition. More importantly, this affective 
modulation of the LPP did not differ from that found during free viewing, suggesting that the picture 
emotionality remained the most salient aspect of the stimulus independently of task-instruction, 
despite the amount of resources that could be committed to the affective evaluation being reduced 
by the presence of an unrelated task. Thus, the results suggest that the evaluation of the emotional 
images and the engagement of motivational systems are independent from contextual factors, and 
occur in a fairly mandatory fashion. 
  Interestingly, behavioral and ERP findings were also found in a further study which 
investigated the effect of stimulus repetition on the processing of emotional stimuli, as reflected not 
only in the emotional interference but also in the neural activity (ERPs), while participants 
performed a parity judgment task (see experiment 2). As shown in fig 1.6, the experiment consisted 
of 4 testing blocks; in the first three “habituation” blocks, the same set of neutral and emotional 
images were repeatedly presented, and in the last “novel” block participants were exposed to a new 
set of images. As expected, the appearance of emotional stimuli, as opposed to neutral distractors, 
slowed down reaction times immediately and prompted an enhanced LPP modulation. Crucially, 
while the behavioral interference effect gradually diminished with stimulus repetitions until it 
disappeared (fig 1.6a), the late positive potential (LPP) amplitude, on the contrary, continued to be 
enhanced for emotional, compared to neutral, distractors during the entire habituation phase (fig 
1.6b). On one hand, these findings closely resemble those of Harris and Pashler (2004) and 
generalize the exposure effect beyond the emotional words, that have been proved to be weaker 




On the other hand, the authors showed that the LPP was not reduced even when emotional 
distractors were spatially decoupled in the task. Importantly, distraction recovered completely when 
new emotional images were presented, suggesting that the attenuation of emotional interference 
was specific for the stimulus experienced and observers cannot prevent distraction from previously 
unseen emotional stimuli. Consequently, the reduction of emotional interference seems to reflect 
the stimulus-specific habituation of the orienting response. 
The authors conclude that the affective modulation of the LPP and the behavioral interference may 
represent different stages of emotional processing. On one hand, the emotional modulation of the 
LPP reflects the resources that are committed to the categorization of the stimulus: evaluation 
processes and engagement of motivational systems. In this way we evaluate all incoming stimuli to 
identify objects or individuals as potential threats or rewards, and the same stimuli are obligatorily 
evaluated at each presentation in order to be categorized as being previously encountered or not. 
On the other hand, when a stimulus is recognized and is “safe”, attentional processes are not 
important since the event does not require further processing or motor action. Thus, the attentional 
allocation system learns to ignore the specific objects to which it is repeatedly exposed in order to 
preserve the limited attentional resources and increase the efficiency of the information processing 







Figure 1.6.  Effect of stimulus repetition on the behavioral interference effect (A) and the affective modulation of the LPP (B) during a 
parity judgment task. Modified from Codispoti et al. 2016 
 
 
  In conclusion, the attention system is naturally hard-wired to respond to emotional stimuli 
since these may indicate the presence of a danger or of a benefit. However, to continue to attend to 
emotional stimuli that are irrelevant is not only a waste of energy, but causes distraction, therefore 
reducing the efficacy with which we perform current tasks. When distraction is reiterated it 
becomes dangerous for the organism’s survival. As for perceptually salient stimuli, our brain has 
developed mechanisms to avoid the unwanted distraction. With experience, we learn to ignore 





1.5. The research problem 
What should be apparent from the brief review above is that certain stimuli have the intrinsic ability 
to capture attention. However, the attentional system may adapt by learning to ignore them when 
they revealed to be clearly inconsequential. Under this “learned control” view, the counter-action of 
top-down control over the counter-productive attentional capture is viewed as a skill that is 
acquired through experience, just like learning to drive a car or play chess. 
This learning process is not always mediated by volitional processes and an exposure to the task and 
all its stimuli (task-relevant and task-irrelevant) is the major determinant of whether a stimulus will 
capture attention. When we have little experience with a task, our attention will be captured by 
salient distractors possibly because we have little or no prior knowledge about whether these 
stimuli entail some positive or negative consequences, and hence may require further processing 
and potentially a prompt reaction. If the stimulus is “beneficial” or “dangerous”, the attention 
dedicated to it will be reinforced, and if not, the stimulus will be discounted and the processing of 
the task at hand will be prioritized. In either case, being exposed to the task and to the salient or 
significant stimulus is fundamental in order to learn “what to attend to” and “what to ignore”. To 
this end, the brain has mechanisms that prevent or attenuate the unwanted distraction. 
Until now, experience-mediated attentional learning has mostly been investigated with perceptually 
salient stimuli. What about significant emotional stimuli? Two previous studies indicated that the 
interference effect of emotional events (i.e., slowing of reaction time) on the concurrent task 
reduced with stimulus repetition, showing that attentional resources are preserved from being 
allocated to well-known inconsequential stimuli (Harris and Pashler, 2004; Codispoti et al., 2016). 




evaluative processing of the emotional content of the stimulus, demonstrating that repetition is not 
sufficient to eliminate the motivational engagement (Codispoti et al., 2016; Mastria et al., 2017). 
It is of note that, so far, no studies have examined what happens when observers are exposed to 
heterogeneous emotional distractors, despite the fact that in the real-world environment we are 
inevitably surrounded by varied distractors. On one hand, emotional interference disappears with 
stimulus repetition but recovers when novel emotional stimuli are presented, suggesting that the 
inhibition of emotional distractors is mediated by stimulus-specific habituation processes (Codispoti 
et al., 2016). On the other hand, the elimination of the interference of variable emotional 
distractors with a reward incentive (Padmala and Pessoa, 2014; Hu et al., 2013) seems to reflect a 
general habituation of the processing of task-irrelevant emotional stimuli that occurs without a 
direct distractor experience.  
The specific aims of this thesis are: 
- to examine whether frequency of exposure to task-irrelevant stimuli modulates the interference of 
all variable (i.e., never repeated) emotional distractors and, if so, whether it is a long-lasting 
attentional modulation or not. 
- to investigate whether extensive practice with heterogeneous distractors modulates the 
interference of novel emotional distractors, that is, whether a “learned control” can generalize to 
emotional stimuli that have never been seen before. 
- to shed light on which stage of the emotional processing is affected by the “distractor-experience” 
effect – stimulus frequency and extensive practice - by comparing behavioral (response times and 






Experience-mediated attentional learning and emotional 
distractors   
 
Experiment 1: Distractor frequency and emotional attentional capture  
 
The goal of Study 1 was to examine the effects of the frequency of occurrence of distractor stimuli 
that were novel emotional pictures, as reflected in both behavioral interference (RTs) and neural 
activity (LPP), while participants were actively engaged in an orientation discrimination task with a 
central gabor stimulus; all pictures, that varied in emotional content (emotional and neutral), were 
always task-irrelevant stimuli.  
1. The attenuation of the emotional interference (slower RT for emotional compared to neutral 
stimuli) found in response to repeated stimuli might indicate that the attentional allocation 
system learns to ignore emotional stimuli over time, and hence attentional capture by 
emotional stimuli is sensitive to an observer’s experience (Harris and Pashler, 2004; Codispoti 
et al., 2016). (a) If so, we might expect the interference effect prompted by novel emotional 
pictures  to be reduced  in a block in which distractors occur frequently (80% of trials) 
compared to a block in which they appear only rarely (20%); on the other hand, it is also 
possible that the frequency with which observers are exposed to distractors does not influence 
the emotional interference effect, indicating that the attentional system may not ignore 
emotional stimuli when they are all novel, that is  never repeated before. 
2. The persistence of the affective modulation of the LPP regardless of stimulus repetition and in 




interpreted as evidence that the evaluation processes, and the engagement of motivational 
systems, occurs mandatorily. Therefore, here we recorded ERPs to clarify which stage of 
emotional processing might be affected by the frequency effect, and we might expect the 
affective modulation of the LPP to remain unchanged when participants are frequently 
exposed to distractors, confirming that contextual factors do not affect motivational 
engagement. However, we cannot exclude the scenario of a gradient of modulation of the LPP 
when varying the frequency of distractor occurrence across blocks. Accordingly, assuming that 
the affective modulation of the LPP cannot be down-modulated below some minimum value, 
as shown by habituation studies, we might expect the magnitude of LPP affective modulation 
to be greater when distracting stimuli are presented in only a small, as compared to a large, 
proportion of trials within a block. 
3. Moreover, we are interested in examining whether “learned control” could be protracted over 
time or whether it is context-specific. In the first case, if frequent exposure to distractors exerts 
a long-lasting effect on attentional capture by emotional stimuli, then we should expect a 
reduced emotional interference in the 20% block for participants (run-down group) that 
performed it after the 80% block - in which they should have had the opportunity to learn to 
ignore emotional distractors - compared to those who performed this block first (run-up 
group). If, on the other hand, frequent exposure to distractors is the prerequisite for reducing 
the emotional interference effect, and thus induces a rather short-lasting bias of attention, we 
expect the “learned control” not to last, and hence we should not find any cross-over effects in 








A total of 24 healthy students (10 females) of the University of Bologna (Italy) participated in the 
experiment as volunteers. The mean age was 20 years, and all participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal visual acuity. 
The study was approved by the Ethical Committee of the Department of Psychology at the 
University of Bologna, and prior to participating, all subjects signed an informed consent. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the run-down (n= 12) or run-up (n= 12) condition order. Due 
to technical problems, EEG data from one male participant were excluded from the analyses. 
 
Materials and design 
As distractor stimuli, a total of 300 pictures were selected from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008), and from public domain pictures available on the 
Internet. The pictures included 75 pleasant (heterosexual erotic couples), 75 unpleasant (mutilated 
bodies), and 150 neutral (people in a variety of daily activities in both enclosed spaces [n=75] and 
outdoors [n=75]). 
To maintain some homogeneity across emotional and neutral contents, all scenes depicted people. 
This “homogeneity” is somewhat important given that several studies have underlined the 
importance of distinguishing between scenes involving human beings and others (e.g., inanimate 




the presence of humans due to empathy (Colden, Bruder & Bradley, 2008; Groen, Wijers, Tucha & 
Althaus, 2013; Calvo et al., 2015).  
In pilot studies, subjective, autonomic and cortical responses to each of these pictures were 
collected in a new sample of undergraduates. Participants (n= 60; 30 female) rated each scene 
valence (on a 1- unpleasant- to 9- unpleasant- scale), and arousal (on a 1-calm-to 9-tension – scale), 
using the standard SAM (self-assessment mannequin) procedure (Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 2008), 
while skin conductance changes were recorded. For the same images, EEG were recorded in 
another sample of participants (n=24; 12 female) while they were passively viewing pictures. Each 
participant saw one picture at a time on a computer screen in a self-paced mode. As shown by 
analyses, unpleasant pictures were judged significantly less pleasant (M= 2.21) than neutral pictures 
(M=5.01), p< .001, which were, in turn, rated less positively than pleasant pictures (M=6.92), p< 
.001. Regarding the subjective rating of arousal, emotional pictures were rated as more arousing 
(pleasant: M= 6.11; unpleasant: M= 6.12) compared to neutral pictures (M= 2.52), ps< .001, and 
pleasant stimuli did not differ from unpleasant stimuli, p= .701. At a cortical level, emotional 
pictures elicited a more pronounced LPP (M= 2.49) compared with neutral pictures (M= 0.14), 
ps<.001, and the LPP amplitude for pleasant and unpleasant pictures did not differ, p= .114. 
Moreover, skin conductance replicated the typical arousal effect with larger changes when viewing 
emotional (M= .059), compared to neutral, stimuli, ps< .002; no differences were found between 
pleasant and unpleasant contents, p=.163.  
Images were displayed on a gray background of a 16-in. monitor at 1,024 × 768 resolution (refresh 
rate of 120 Hz), controlled by an IBM computer. Each scene subtended 14.3° horizontal by 10.8° 
vertical degrees of visual angle and was positioned either to the left or to the right of a central 
Gabor patch. The Gabor patch (sinusoidal gratings with a Gaussian envelope), used for the 




vertically oriented. Gabor patches were generated using custom MATLAB software by overlapping 
two distinct Gabor filters with the same orientation but different frequencies (0.94 and 9.4 
frequency x visual angle, respectively). The distance between the inner edge of the distractor image 
and the center of the Gabor patch was a 4° visual angle. All stimuli were equated in brightness and 
contrast to control for potential confounds resulting from low-level visual properties of the images.   
Stimulus presentation and data collection were performed using E-Prime software (Schneider, 
Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002).  
For each participant, all of the 300 images (150 emotional and 150 neutral) were presented during 
the experimental session. The session consisted of two blocks of 300 trials; critically, in the two 
blocks the frequency of distractor presentation was set differently, and participants were not 
explicitly informed about this uneven distribution. In the 20% block, distractors appeared in 20% of 
the trials, meaning that a total of 30 distractors (15 neutral and 15 emotional) were presented. In 
the 80% block, distractors were displayed in 80% of the trials, for a total of 240 distractors (120 
neutral, 120 emotional). In both blocks, therefore, half of the distractors were neutral and half were 
emotional (Fig 2.1). The order of block presentation was introduced as a between-subject factor 
with a group of participants that started with the 20% block (run-up group) and a second group that 
started with the 80% block (run-down group). 
Across participants, each picture was randomly assigned to either the 20% (run-up group) or the 
80% block (run-down group). Nevertheless, within participants each picture was never repeated 
across the experiment (i.e., it was novel).  
Before the beginning of the experiment, participants performed a set of 100 practice trials, in which 
no distractors appeared, to familiarize themselves with the task. After a break, the two experimental 




The order of trial type (trials without distractor, emotional-distractor trials and neutral-distractor 
trials were pseudo-randomized with the following restrictions: (i) the emotional pictures occurred 
no more than three times consecutively, (ii) emotional pictures of the same valence were never 
presented one after the other, (iii) pictures did not appear more than three times consecutively on 
the same side. E-prime software synchronized the presentation of the stimuli and triggered EEG 




Figure 2.1. Experimental design in Experiment 1a. 
 
Procedure 
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants signed an informed consent form. Participants were then 
seated in a recliner in a small, sound-attenuated, dimly lit room, and the EEG sensor net was 
attached. Participants sat in front of the computer monitor with their head supported by a chinrest. 
The distance between the eyes and the monitor was 60 cm for all subjects.  
Figure 2.2 shows the sequence of events of the experimental paradigm. Each trial started with the 




appearance of a Gabor patch in the center of the screen for 150 ms. The participant’s task was to 
determine, as quickly and as accurately as possible, whether the Gabor patch was vertical or 
horizontal by pressing one of two buttons on the keyboard (“v” or “b”) with the index finger of their 
dominant hand. In distractor-present trials, an image (either emotional or neutral) was presented 
simultaneously with the Gabor, appearing equally often in the left or right visual field. Participants 
were explicitly informed that there would be a peripheral distracting stimulus (i.e. the image) in 
some trials but that they had to maintain fixation on the center of the screen, focusing their 
attention exclusively on the Gabor patch while ignoring distracting images. Consecutive trials were 
separated by a gray screen for a variable amount of time ranging from 1000 to 1750 ms (intertrial 
interval, ITI). During this period, behavioral responses to the orientation task were collected.  
Before the beginning of the experiment, participants performed a practice block of 100 trials in 
which distractors were never presented. During the experiment, the run-up group performed first 
the 20% block and then the 80% block; the order was reversed for the run-down group. Between 
each block, a 2-min break was given, and each block always started with 20 distractor-absent trials. 
The experiment lasted approximately 28 minutes.  
In order to assess participants’ awareness of the manipulation of the frequency of distractor 
occurrence across blocks, directly following completion of the experiment they were asked to 
answer post-experimental questions about (i) whether and how the two blocks differed and, 
afterward, (ii) to indicate how frequently distractors had occurred within each block (from 1 in each 






Figure 2.2. Sequence of events and trial type in Experiment 1a. 
 
EEG recording and processing  
Electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded at a sampling rate of 512 Hz using the ActiveTwo 
BioSemi system (BioSemi, Amsterdam, The Netherlands), with a 62 dense sensor array. The EEG was 
referenced to an additional active electrode (CMS = common mode sense; with ground in additional 
electrode DRL = driven right leg) during recording. All data were re-referenced to the average of all 
scalp electrodes. Additionally, a sensor was attached below the left eye. For each trial, the EEG was 
corrected for blinks and eye movements using a regression technique based on the electrodes 
above and below the left eye, and to the left and right side of the eyes (Schlögl et al., 2007). Off-line 
analysis was performed using Emegs (Peyk, De Cesarei, & Junghöfer, 2011). First, data were initially 
filtered (40 Hz low-pass and 0.1 Hz high-pass). Then, trials and sensors containing artifacts were 
detected through a statistical procedure specifically developed for dense-array EEG (Junghöfer, 




discarded; for the rest of the trials, sensors containing artifactual data were replaced by 
interpolating the nearest good sensors. Finally, data were re-referenced to the average of all 
sensors, and a baseline correction based on the 200 ms prior to stimulus onset was performed. 
Averaged ERP waveforms were calculated according to factors Block and Trial Type. Region and time 
interval of interest were selected based on an initial examination of the ERP waveforms and 
topography. The LPP was scored as the average of the ERP waveform in the 450 and 900 ms after 
stimulus onset at the parieto-occipital sensor group (see cluster of sensors in Appendix A) where the 
LPP amplitude was largest (Picton et al., 2000).   
 
Data collection and analysis 
Reaction times (RTs) and ERP analyses were performed only on accurate trials. Practice trials and the 
20 distractor-absent trials before each block served to acquaint participants with the task and were 
not included in the analyses. Trials with RTs shorter than 250 ms or longer than 1350 ms were 
treated as inaccurate. In each participant, for each valence of each condition, response times above 
or below three standard deviations from the mean were discarded as outliers. These criteria 
removed 3.6% of the data. 
These data were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA; using the Huynh-
Feldt correction) for within-subject factors Block (two levels: 20%, 80%) and Trial Type (three levels: 
absent, neutral, emotional) to evaluate the overall frequency effect. Subsequently, an ANOVA on 
Block and Valence (two levels: neutral, emotional) was conducted to analyze, specifically, the effect 
of distractor frequency on the behavioral interference effect of emotional stimuli and on the 
affective modulation of the LPP. Also, an ANOVA with factors Block and Trial Type as within subject-
factors and Condition Order (two levels: Run-Up, Run-Down) as between-subject factors was 




test, the partial eta squared statistic (η2p), indicating the proportion of variance that is explained by 




Reaction times (RTs). Participants were slower in the orientation discrimination task when 
distractor images appeared abruptly, and performance was especially disrupted when such images 
had an emotional, compared to a neutral, content. Critically, this emotional interference effect was 
attenuated in the 80% block in comparison with the 20% block (Fig. 2.3).  
Statistically, analysis of RTs yielded a significant effect of Trial Type, F (2, 46) = 26.359, p < .001, η2p = 
.534, indicating slower RTs in distractor-present trials (neutral and emotional) compared to 
distractor-absent trials, Fs (1,23) > 41.514, ps < .001, η
2
ps > .643, and in emotional-distractor trials 
compared to neutral-distractor trials, F(1,23) = 12.415, p = .002 , η
2
p = .351. The main effect of Block 
was not found, F (1,23) = 1.440, p = .242, η
2
p = .059. Importantly, a significant Block x Trial Type 
interaction was observed, F (2, 46) = 21.495, p < .001, η2p = .483. Following up on this interaction, 
the Block effect was tested in each type of trial: the appearance of emotional stimuli slowed down 
responses more in the 20% than in the 80% block, F(1, 23) = 9.753, p = .005, η2p = .298, while no 
difference was found between the two blocks for neutral distracting trials, F(1, 23) =1.150, p = .295, 
η2p = .048. In the 80% block (versus 20%), however, participants were slower to respond to the task 
in those trials in which no distractor actually appeared, F (1, 23) =5.460, p = .029, η2p = .192. More 
importantly for our experimental question, a subsequent ANOVA confirmed a significant Block x 
Valence (neutral, emotional) interaction, F (1, 23) =6.732, p = .016, η2p = .226. Pairwise comparisons 




F(1, 23) = 11.369, p = .003, η2p = .331, and this emotional interference effect was still significant, but 
severely reduced, in the 80% block (M= 9.33 ms), F (1, 23) =4.902, p = .037, η2p = .176.  
 
 
Figure 2.3. Effect of the frequency of picture occurrence on reaction times in Experiment 1a. Error bars show ±1 SEM calculated 
within participants using the method of O’Brien and Cousineau (2014). 
 
Although there was a reduction in emotional interference in the 80% block, participants who later 
performed the 20% block (run-down group) were not more effective in attenuating the interference 
of rare emotional distractors, compared to the participants who performed the 20% block first (run-
up group) (Fig. 2.4), suggesting that the effect of frequent exposure did not last, and hence no carry-
over effects were found. This was confirmed by the failure to find a significant Condition Order X 
Block X Trial Type interaction, F (2, 44) = .917, p = .384, η2p = .040, or a Condition Order X Block X 






Figure 2.4. Effect of condition order on the emotional interference effect in Experiment 1a. Error bars show ±1 SEM calculated within 
participants using the method of O’Brien and Cousineau (2014). 
 
A further analysis was conducted to evaluate the possibility that the attenuation of the emotional 
interference effect reflected the number of times the participants were exposed to distractors, 
rather than frequency per se. Specifically, in the 80% block (300 trials), distractors appeared in 240 
trials, whereas in the 20% block, they appeared in only 60 trials, making the alternative explanation 
possible: the cognitive system may require a minimum number of exposures to distractors in order 
to learn how to ignore them. To test this possibility, we analyzed only the first 75 trials which 
included the first 60 distractor-present trials (30 neutral and 30 emotional). If frequency was 
confirmed to be determinant, as suggested in literature on perceptually salient distraction, then we 
expected to still find a reduced interference effect in the 80% compared to the 20% block. 
Otherwise, if the number of distractors was the crucial factor, then the interference effect should 
not differ between the two blocks (the first 75 trials of the 80% block and the 60 trials of the 20 
percent block). Results  showed a significant Block x Valence interaction, F (1,23) =7.676, p =.011, 
η2p=.250, with an interference of emotional stimuli in the 20% block (p= .003) that completely 




presentation (frequency) in driving the difference in emotional interference between the 20% and 
the 80% blocks. 
 
Accuracy. As expected, accuracy was generally high (M=97.4%), indicating that the discrimination 
task was perceptually easy (low load perceptual task); see Table 1 in Appendix A. An ANOVA with the 
same factors as above was conducted on accuracy, but only a main effect of Trial Type was found, F 
(1, 46) = 11.030, p =0.001, η2p = .324, indicating a larger number of errors when viewing emotional 
stimuli, compared to neutral ones, F (1, 23) = 11.429, p = .003, η2p = .332, and to distractor-absent 
trials, F (1, 23) = 15.005, p = .001, η2p = .395, but no difference in accuracy between neutral 
distracting trials and distractor-absent trials, F (1, 23) = .385, p = .541, η2p = .016. However, no 
significant main effect of Block, F (1, 23) = 1.557, p = .225, η2p = .063, or significant Block x Trial Type 
interaction, F (2, 46) = 3.091, p = .070, η2p = .118 were found, ruling out the possibility that the RT 
pattern observed was the result of speed-accuracy trade-offs.  
 
Late positive potential (LPP) 
As illustrated in Fig. 2.5, emotional stimuli elicited a larger positivity over parieto-occipital sensor 
sites in the 450-900 ms time interval. Yet, although the affective modulation of the LPP seemed to 
be somewhat smaller in the high frequency compared to the low frequency block, it continued to be 
significantly enhanced in both blocks.  
Accordingly, the main effects of Block, F (1, 22) = 6.233, p = .021, η2p = .221, Trial Type, F (2, 44) = 
22.577, p < .001, η2p = .506 and a Block X Trial Type interaction, F (2, 44) = 9.257, p <.001, η
2
p = .296, 
were significant. Following up on this interaction, distractor trials, both emotional, and neutral 
distractors, , elicited a more positive LPP amplitude when appearing rarely in the 20% block 






.171 respectively), and, no difference was found for distractor-absent trials between the two blocks, 
F (1,22) = 1.412, p=.247, η2p = .060. Moreover, the interaction Block X Valence (neutral, emotional) 
approached significance, F(1, 22) = 3.994, p = .058, η2p = .154,  and the following simple main test 
effects showed that the LPP enhancement to emotional compared to neutral pictures was larger in 
the 20% block (M= 1.06 μV),  F(1, 22) = 11.690, p = .002, η2p = .347; in fact, this cortical modulatory 
effect was only marginally reduced in the 80% block (M= 0.60 μV), F(1, 22) = 12.685, p = .002, η2p = 
.336. Further analysis showed that modulation of this cortical modulatory effect did not differ 
between the run-up and run-down groups of participants, indicating that it was not affected by the 
order with which the two blocks were performed. Indeed, an ANOVA on LPP amplitude, with 
Condition Order as between-subject factor and Block and Trial Type as within-subject factors failed 





Figure 2.5. Effect of the frequency of picture occurrence on the (A) LPP amplitude in Experiment 1a. Error bars show ±1 SEM 
calculated within participants using the method of O’Brien and Cousineau (2014). (B): Grand-averaged ERP waveforms averaged over 
parieto-occipital sensors used for the analysis of the LPP for neutral and emotional pictures in the 20% block and in the 80% block. 





Awareness of distractor frequency  
We examined whether the reduced emotional interference in the 80% block vs the 20% block 
critically depended on participants having “recognized” the high frequency of distractor occurrence 
in the 80% block. To determine participants’ awareness, we analyzed their responses to the general 
(post-experimental) query about whether the two blocks differed from each other. Ten of the 24 
participants (42%) answered “no” and, after a brief interview with the experimenter, they reported 
not having noticed any change in the frequency with which distractors occurred between the two 
blocks. Subsequently, for the participants who were aware, we analyzed their response when asked 
to approximately indicate the frequency of distractor occurrence within each block; 10 of the 14 
participants correctly indicated which of the two blocks was the one in which distractors occurred 
frequently, while 4 participants were completely wrong.  
Moreover, we analyzed the results separately for those who were aware (n=10) and those who were 
unaware (n=14) of the frequency manipulation as a between-subjects variable. There were no 
interactions with the other variables, indicating that some awareness regarding the high frequency 
of distractor occurrence did not determine attenuation of the emotional interference effect, Group 




As expected, the findings of Experiment 1 indicate that, despite observers being actively engaged in 
a focal task, pictures with an emotional content captured attention, even when appearing in an 
irrelevant peripheral location, as indicated by their general interference in task performance (i.e., 




frequently exposed to distractor pictures (80% of the trials versus 20%), indicating that the strength 
with which emotional stimuli captured attention was modulated by the frequency of exposure to 
distractors. Considering that the irrelevant images were all novel, the attenuation of the emotional 
interference seems to be ascribed to a general inhibition toward task-irrelevant emotional stimuli 
rather than a stimulus-specific mechanism. To better clarify which stage of the emotional processing 
was affected by the frequency effect, ERPs were recorded, showing an overall reduction of the LPP 
amplitude when the frequency of task-irrelevant images was increased, suggesting a reduced 
attentional allocation toward the irrelevant images. Critically, the affective modulation of the LPP – 
i.e., the larger positivity elicited by emotional compared to neutral pictures - was preserved in the 
high frequency context, showing only a trend toward reduction, despite the behavioral emotional 
interference in the primary task being strongly attenuated. Therefore, these findings, taken 
together, indicate that emotional distractors continue to activate the motivational systems, as 
suggested by the LPP affective modulation, even when attentional allocation to these stimuli 
habituates as indicated by the behavioral emotional interference. 
 The affective modulation of the LPP and behavioral measures – such as response times - 
have been widely used as indexes of attention allocation. While the LPP is considered to reflect both 
the engagement of attentional resources by emotional stimuli and the activation of motivational 
systems (e.g., Lang et al., 1997; Schupp et al., 2006; Ferrari et al., 2011), behavioral interference is, 
by far, the most widely used index for investigating the attentional capture phenomenon in research 
on emotional, salience, and deviance distraction. Specifically, in literature on perceptual salience, 
behavioral costs in target detection (elongation of RTs or lower accuracy) are considered to be 
reliable, indirect measures of the fact that the presence of a salient task-irrelevant stimulus captures 
involuntary attention, causing, consequently, a poorer processing of the task (Theeuwes 1992). 




actual attention allocation to the stimulus, while the LPP represents a more temporally proximal 
measure of the evaluative processes involved. Therefore, several factors might affect the behavioral 
interference, eliminating it even as the brain continues to process the emotional stimuli. It is worth 
noting that affective modulation of the LPP has been investigated more often during free viewing 
when pictures are attended to without a task. However, recent studies that measured LPP in the 
presence of a task, and hence when attentional resources were constrained, did not find a 
reduction even after numerous repetitions of the same emotional image. It is significant that recent 
evidence similarly indicates that electrophysiological and behavioral measures of distraction (i.e., 
behavioral interference), can be dissociated since they reflect different processes. These works 
suggest that the affective modulation of the LPP might be an index of the engagement of 
motivational systems more than of attentional processes per se (Codispoti et al., 2016). Moreover, 
such a dissociation is not exclusively related to emotional distraction but has been reported even in 
literature on deviance distraction, in which the behavioral distraction induced by the appearance of 
a rare and unexpected sound (i.e., deviant) can vary widely in the absence of variation in the 
electrophysiological measures of distraction (e.g., P3a), suggesting that behavioral distraction is 
controlled by further, and presumably later, mechanisms (e.g., Schröger & Wolff, 1998; 
Wetzel, Schröger & Widmann, 2013). From these findings, it is possible that the attenuated 
emotional interference reported in the present studies is the result of inhibitory mechanisms that 
act after evaluation processes, and the engagement of motivational systems, have occurred, 
possibly with the aim of preventing limited resources from being allocated to inconsequential 
emotional stimuli.  
These findings raise the question of which mechanisms may subtend the attenuation of 
behavioral interference. In the present study, by using only novel and heterogeneous pictures, it is 




rather than a stimulus-specific habituation (Codispoti et al., 2016). This decrease in emotional 
interference may be due to the occurrence of a generalization to features that are shared between 
individual scenes. Gati and Ben-Shakhar (1990) presented evidence that habituation can be based 
on the repetition of certain features across images, rather than the repetition of the images per se. 
Accordingly, in this experiment, specific features were presented among the different scenes (e.g., 
blood in mutilation scenes, or pink bodies in the erotic images) and so the OR could have habituated 
due to their repetition. If the habituation of the OR occurred, then the emotional interference 
should be expected to gradually decrease over time– with the greatest interference at the beginning 
of the 80% block when the features were relatively novel and the least interference at the end when 
the features had been widely repeated. To explore this possibility, a further analysis was conducted 
by splitting the 80% block into three mini-blocks of 100 trials: each mini-block contained 20 
distractor-absent trials, 40 neutral-distractor trials and 40 emotional-distractor trials (20 mutilation 
and 20 erotic images). However, no reliable habituation emerged across the three mini-blocks, 
ruling out this possibility and indicating in general that the inhibition of emotional distractors 
occurred rapidly and did not develop over time [Mini-block (3 levels) x valence (neutral, emotional), 
F (2, 46) =1.148, p=.326, η2p = .048]. 
Another possibility is that the attenuation of the emotional distraction might reflect a 
preparatory inhibitory mechanism that is engaged in order to protect the target processing from the 
expected occurrence of emotional distractors. Specifically, there is a form of preparatory inhibitory 
control of attention which is referred to as “expectation suppression” (Noonan, Crittenden, Jensen 
& Stokes, 2017). Similar to the Comparator model of Sokolov, predictive coding models suggest that 
the cognitive system generates and updates prediction about incoming input by extracting stimulus 
regularities from the surrounding environment. In this way, the world is simplified, and the 




they provide little new information; it is not necessary to process them further. Thus, predictable 
stimuli tend to be less behaviorally significant than new, surprising events. In accordance with this 
hypothesis, Kennedy and coworkers (Kennedy, Newman & Most, 2017) have recently demonstrated 
that the predictability of emotional distractors is a determinant for preventing their attentional 
capture; specifically, observers voluntarily shielded themselves from emotional interference when 
they were explicitly forewarned trial-by-trial about the occurrence of emotional distractors, and 
distractor inhibition was effective when the participants were alerted as to the type of distractor to 
expect, compared to when a general alert about the occurrence of a distractor was given.   
In Experiment 1a, no prior information regarding the specific occurrence of emotional stimuli was 
given to participants, and they were not explicitly aware of the high frequency of distracting events, 
as responses from a final questionnaire suggest. However, the emotional stimuli occurred more 
frequently (40%), making the temporal distance between the occurrence of two consecutive 
emotional stimuli much shorter (M = 2.03sec) in the 80% block compared to the 20% block (10%; 
M= 20.60sec). It is possible that emotional stimuli were therefore implicitly expected in the high 
frequency block, leading observers to engage preparatory inhibitory mechanisms in order to 
prevent emotional distraction.  
Taking the above considerations into account, Experiment 2 was conducted to clarify the observed 
reduction of emotional interference in the high distractor frequency context. Specifically, the aim 
was to disentangle whether this reduction was due to:  
a) the short time interval between emotional distractors and hence the predictability of the 
occurrence of emotional distractors; 





To this aim, we reproduced the same paradigm used in Experiment 1 by presenting two blocks that 
differed in the overall frequency of distractor occurrence (20% versus 80%) with the critical 
difference that emotional pictures were rare (10%) in both of them and, therefore, only the 
frequency of occurrence of neutral distractors was varied between the two blocks. Crucially, the 
temporal distance between the occurrence of one emotional stimulus and the next did not differ 
between the blocks (approximately 20sec).  
(i) At a behavioral level, if observers inhibit emotional distractors when their occurrence is 
expected – and therefore what matters is the lapse between their occurrence, that is, 
the frequency of emotional distractors - then we should not find a frequency effect. By 
contrast, if the critical factor is the mere high occurrence of distractors independently of 
their content (overall frequency of distractor occurrence), then even the high 
occurrence of neutral distractors should matter, and we should find a reduction in the 
emotional interference in the 80% block compared to in the 20% block, regardless of the 
rareness of emotional stimuli. 
(ii) At a cortical level, if the affective modulation of the LPP is not affected by contextual 
factors such as the time interval between emotional distractors or the overall frequency 
distractor occurrence, as suggested by Experiment 1a, we should observe no difference 
between the two blocks. Alternatively, the marginal reduction of the emotional 
modulation of the LPP in the high frequency block could indicate that evaluation 
processes, and the engagement of motivational systems, are sensitive to the frequency 
of occurrence of emotional distractors. However, considering that emotional stimuli 
occurred only in 40% of trials, we failed to find a significant reduction. In this case, if the 
only critical factor is the emotional frequency, we should not expect to find any 







The same method described in Experiment 1a was used, with the variations described in the Design 
and Procedure section.  
 
Participants 
A total of 20 healthy students (11 females; mean age: 21.6 years) of the University of Bologna (Italy) 
participated in the experiment as volunteers, and signed an informed consent form prior to 
beginning the experiment. The study was approved by the Ethical Committee of the Department of 
Psychology at the University of Bologna. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual 
acuity and none were color blind. All of them were naïve as to the aim of the experiment. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the run-down (n= 10) or run-up (n= 10) condition order.   
  
Materials  
Picture stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 1. Additionally, 180 new neutral images 
(pictures depicting objects, urban places and building interior) were selected on the Internet to be 









Design and procedure  
Similar to Experiment 1a, Experiment 1b consisted of a practice phase (100 trials), which was 
followed by two experimental blocks, each consisting of 300 trials: the 20% block and the 80% 
block, whose order of presentation was balanced across participants. As shown in Fig. 3.1, the 
design of Experiment 1b was identical to that used in Experiment 1 with the important exception 
that emotional distracting pictures were presented only rarely (10% of the trials) in both blocks. In 
the 20% block, pictures were present in 20% of the trials (half emotional and half neutral content). 
In the 80% block, rare emotional distractors (10%) and frequent neutral distractors (70%) occurred 
in 80% of the trials. The time lapse between the occurrence of emotional stimuli was also kept 
similar between the two blocks; in the 20% block, the mean was 20.11 seconds (ranging from a 
minimum of 2.02s to a maximum of 42.52s) and in the 80% block it was 20.53 seconds (ranging 
from 4.05s to 68.85s).  
As in Experiment 1a, pictures were never repeated within or across blocks. Observers were 
instructed to focus on the task and ignore task-irrelevant images, and they were not explicitly 





Figure 3.1. Experimental design of Experiment 1b. Comparison between the 80% block used in Experiment 1a and Experiment 1b 
 
Data Analyses 
As in Experiment 1a, incorrect trials and outlier trials with RTs above or below 3SDs above the 
individual means in each block for each trial type were excluded from further analyses, with this 
outlier trimming resulting in a removal of 3.7% of the total RT data. The statistical design was 
identical to that described in Experiment 1a. 
An ANOVA on RTs and LPP with factors Block (2 levels) and Valence (3 levels) was performed 
considering only the 10% of neutral-distractor trials containing human beings, instead of all the 
neutral categories (human and non-human) as done in the following analyses. By excluding the 
neutral distractors without human beings that were added in the 80% block, in these analyses the 
20% and 80% blocks were equal regarding number, frequency, and semantic content of neutral 




Appendix B. By analyzing only human-neutral, results did not differ from findings that included all 




Response times (RTs). As shown in Fig. 3.2, the current behavioral results strictly resemble those 
of the previous experiment. As expected, the abrupt appearance of pictures distracted participants 
even though such images were completely irrelevant for the task at hand, and the greatest 
interference was yielded when pictures conveyed an emotional content. Importantly, observers 
were less distracted by novel rare emotional pictures when the frequency of occurrence of the 
overall task-irrelevant images increased.  Statistically, analyses of RTs yielded a significant effect of 
Trial Type, F (2, 38) =47.067, p < .001, η2p = .712, with slower RTs in distractor-present trials 
(emotional and neutral) compared to distractor-absent trials, Fs (1,19) > 53.637, ps < .001, η
2
ps > .738 
and, especially, in emotional-distractor trials compared to neutral-distractor trials, F (1, 19) = 
31.419, p < .001, η2p = .623. No significant effect of Block was observed, F (1,19) = .996, p = .331, η
2
p 
= .050. Finally, a significant interaction Block x Trial Type was found, F (2, 38) =12.330, p < .001, η2p = 
.394. Following up on this interaction, the Block effect was tested for each Trial Type: emotional 
stimuli slowed down response times more when they appeared in the 20% block than in the 80% 
block, F (1, 19) =7.737, p = .012, η2p = .289, while no difference was found for neutral distractors 
between the two blocks, F (1, 19) =.346, p = .563, η2p = .018. Conversely, as in Experiment 1, 
participants were faster to respond to the task in the 20% block than in the 80% block during trials 
in which no distractor was presented, F (1, 19) = 5.693, p = .028, η2p = .231. More importantly for 




affected by the frequency of distractor occurrence, as confirmed by a significant Block X Valence 
interaction, F (1, 19) =6.302, p = .021, η2p = .249. Following up on this interaction, we found that a 
Valence effect was still present in the 80% block (M= 29.03 ms), F(1, 19) =26.771, p < .001, η2p = 
.585, but it was severely attenuated compared to the 20% block (M= 56.67 ms), F(1, 19) = 21.993, p 
< .001, η2p = .537. 
On the other hand, this modulation of the behavioral interference between the two blocks was not 
affected, even in part, by the order with which the two blocks were performed (Fig. 3.3). 
Statistically, not only did the Condition Order x Block x Trial Type interaction, F (2, 36) = .992, p = 
.390, η2p = .049 fail to reach significance, but also the Condition Order x Block x Valence interaction 
was non-significant, F (1, 18)= .013, p = .912, η2p = .001, indicating that in the run-down there were 
no crossover effects from the 80% block in which attentional capture by rare emotional stimuli was 
attenuated in the subsequent 20% block.  
 
Figure 3.2. Effect of the frequency of picture occurrence on reaction times in Experiment 1b. Error bars show ±1 SEM calculated 






Figure 3.3. Effect of condition order on the emotional interference effect in Experiment 1b Error bars show ±1 SEM calculated within 
participants using the method of O’Brien and Cousineau (2014). 
 
Accuracy. An ANOVA, with the same factors as before, was also conducted on accuracy (see Table 1 
in the Appendix A), but no significant main effects or interaction emerged, thus excluding the 
possibility of the observed RT-pattern being due to a speed-accuracy trade-off [Block, F (1,19) = 
1.806, p = .195, η2p = .087; Trial Type, F (2,38) = 3.053, p = .082, η
2
p = .138; Block X Trial Type 
interaction, F (2,38) =.235, p = .792, η2p = .012].   
 
Late positive potential 
As illustrated in Fig. 3.4, emotional stimuli elicited a larger positivity over parieto-occipital sensor 
sites in the 450-900 ms time interval, and emotional modulation of the LPP was enhanced when 
rare emotional distractors were embedded among frequent neutral distractors. 
As expected, the late positive potential was modulated by Trial Type, F (2, 38) = 36.978, p < .001, η2p 
= .661, with emotional stimuli eliciting a more pronounced LPP compared to neutral ones, F (1, 19) 




.700, η2p = .008. A significant Block X Trial Type interaction, F (2, 38) = 3.251, p =.050, η
2
p = .146 was 
followed by simple main effect tests. LPP amplitude was more positive when viewing a rare 
emotional image in the 80% block than in the 20% block, F (1, 19) = 4.283, p =.052, η2p = .184, while 
there was no variation between the two blocks when viewing neutral images, F (1,19) = 2.233, p 
=.152, η2p = .105. In the same way, there was no difference in distractor-absent trials between the 
two blocks, F (1,19) =.212, p =.650, η2p = .011. Overall, the emotional modulation of the LPP differed 
between the two blocks, F (1, 19) = 5.487, p = .030, η2p = .224, and further investigation as to the 
effect of Valence in each block confirmed that emotional stimuli prompted a larger LPP compared to 
neutral stimuli in both the 20% block (M= 0.93 μV), F(1, 19) = 19.940, p < .001, η2p = .512 and the 
80% block (M= 1.69 μV), F(1, 19) = 33.666, p < .001, η2p = .639 showing, critically, that the 
emotional modulation tended to increase, rather than reduce, in the 80% block.  
The Order of Presentation did not interact with any of the within factors or interactions; Order X 
Block X Trial Type, F= (2, 36) = .905, p = .414, η2p = .048, and Order X Block X Valence, F (1, 18) = 





Figure 3.4. Effect of the frequency of picture occurrence on the (A) LPP amplitude in Experiment 1b. Error bars show ±1 SEM 
calculated within participants using the method of O’Brien and Cousineau (2014). (B): Grand-averaged ERP waveforms averaged over 
parieto-occipital sensors used for the analysis of the LPP for neutral and emotional pictures in the 20% block and in the 80% block. 





Awareness of distractor frequency  
As in Experiment 1a, we examined whether the modulation of the emotional interference between 
the two blocks depended on participants having “recognized” the high frequency of distractor 
occurrence in the 80% block. By analyzing the participants’ responses to the general (post-
experimental) query about whether the two blocks differed from each other, we found that 13 of 
the 20 participants (65%), more than half of the sample, answered “no” and, even after a brief 
interview with the experimenter, they reported not having noticed any changes in the frequency 
with which distractors had occurred between the two blocks. For these participants who were 
aware of the difference, we analyzed the following answer in which we asked to them to 
approximately report the distractor frequency within each block; 5 of the 7 correctly indicated 
which of the two blocks was the one in which distractors occurred frequently, while 2 participants 
were completely wrong. 
We analyzed the behavioral results separately for those who were aware (n=5) and those who were 
unaware (n=15) about the frequency manipulation as a between-subjects variable. Since there were 
no interactions with the other variables, Group (aware, unaware) x Block (20%, 80%) x Valence 
(emotional, neutral), F (1, 18) =.318, p=.580, η2p = .017, it is possible that some awareness about 
the high frequency of distractor occurrence is not determinant for the attenuation of the emotional 
distraction. 
 
Comparison between experiments 
We performed a direct comparison between the two experiments to assess whether both the 
overall distractor frequency and the specific frequency of emotional stimuli played a critical role in 




and Valence as within-subject factors and Experiment as between-subject factor did not find a 
significant interaction, F (1, 42) = .045, p = .832, η2p = .001, suggesting that the effect of frequency 
on the behavioral interference was not, even in part, due to the temporal distance and/or the 
specific frequency of emotional distractors. 
 
Figure 3.5. Comparison between Experiment1a and 1b. Top: the graphics show response times for emotional and neutral trials in both 
blocks for Experiment 1a (on the left) and Experiment 1b (on the right). Middle: the difference score (emotional minus neutral) in the 




At a cortical level (Fig. 3.6), an Experiment x Block x Valence interaction was present, F (1,41) = 
9.773, p = .003, η2p = .192, indicating that the affective modulation of the LPP varied between the 
two experiments. Specifically, the 20% blocks of the two experiments showed a similar modulation 
of the LPP, which is not surprising, considering that the 20% block of Experiment 1a was identical to 
the 20% block of Experiment 1b; F (1,41) = .123, p = .727, η2p = .003. Crucially, the Valence effect 
differed between the two 80% blocks, F (1,41) = 11.093, p = .002, η2p = .213, and, interestingly, 
suggesting that the LPP was not sensitive to the overall distractor frequency but rather to some 
factors related to the specific occurrence of emotional stimuli per se, such as their frequency or the 
temporal distance between their appearance. 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Comparison of the modulation of the LPP between Experiment 1a and 1b in the 20% block (on the left) and in the 80% 






Experiment 1 suggests that the susceptibility to distraction by emotional stimuli changed as a 
function of the frequency of distractor occurrence, despite emotional stimuli being rare, and, thus, 
their occurrence being impossible to predict. Specifically, emotional interference was reduced in 
contexts in which distractors occurred too frequently (i.e., in the majority of trials), independently of 
whether emotional stimuli were frequent (Experiment 1a), or only rarely presented in the midst of 
frequent neutral distractors (Experiment 1b). In contrast, the affective modulation of the LPP was 
only marginally affected by the frequency of emotional distractors (Experiment 1a), and was not 
reduced by high distractor frequency when emotional distractors were rare (Experiment 1b), 
indicating that behavioral and electrophysiological indexes of distraction reflect different stages of 
emotional processing. Altogether, these findings suggest that evaluation of emotional stimuli, and 
activation of motivational systems, occur mandatorily; however, some further and probably later 
mechanisms control emotional attentional capture in order to reduce their distracting effect.  
This conclusion is in line with a recent study (Grimshaw, Kranz, Carmel, Moody & Devue, 
2017), which has demonstrated the effect of distractor frequency on emotional interference by 
using a low load perceptual task similar to that used in the current study. However, the two 
paradigms have critical methodological differences which it is worth dwelling on. Specifically, in 
Grimshaw and collaborators' study (2017) a target letter and five small "o"s appeared in the center 
of the screen for 100 ms and observers were required to discriminate the identity of the target (N or 
X), while ignoring a peripheral distracting image that was presented at the same time below or 
above the letter display. The frequency of distractor occurrence was manipulated in a between-
subjects design: a group of observers was exposed to the high distractor frequency condition in 




the low distractor frequency condition in which distractors appeared rarely (25%). Each condition 
consisted in 8 blocks of 48 trials each and, critically, the valence of the distractors was blocked so 
that in each block neutral and emotional images were never presented together. The findings clearly 
showed that emotional distractors interfered in the low frequency blocks, but that this emotional 
interference completely disappeared in the high frequency blocks. The authors hypothesize that 
top-down inhibitory mechanisms of attentional control were differently engaged based on 
contextual factors: when emotional stimuli were rare they were attended to and evaluated because 
they could carry important information, and only afterwards was attention reoriented toward the 
primary task (reactive attentional control). Conversely, when emotional stimuli were frequent, and 
did not entail any consequences, their informational value was limited thus making it convenient to 
prevent attention from being allocated to them by preemptively engaging inhibitory mechanisms 
(proactive attentional control). Although the authors' interpretation is appealing, several 
mechanisms could explain this effect, and the lack of an emotional attentional capture in the high 
frequency condition could be due to several factors, such as the predictability of the occurrence of 
emotional stimuli or a reduced motivational engagement. Moreover, although the observation that 
the emotional interference disappeared with frequent distractor occurrence suggests that the 
emotional content no longer impacted picture processing, supporting a scenario in which emotional 
distractors were effectively inhibited, the inhibition of such stimuli may occur at different stages of 
processing.  Therefore, as far as the nature of this reduction is concerned, the study by Grimshaw 
and coworkers (2017) leaves several critical questions open that we have attempted to address.  
Regarding the predictability of emotional distractors, in the study by Grimshaw et al. (2017), 
emotional and neutral images were presented separately in distinct blocks, and therefore there was 
no uncertainty as to the nature of the distractor that would appear in each block. Thus, in the high 




was not only expected, but observers also knew whether those distractors would have an emotional 
content (Kennedy et al., 2017; Zhao and Most, 2018). It was therefore possible that the emotional 
valence of task-irrelevant images needed to be fully predictable in order for observers to proactively 
inhibit the distractors. Is it possible to ignore emotional distractors when we do not know whether 
or not the appearing distracting images will be emotional? To answer this question, in the current 
paradigm, emotional (pleasant and unpleasant) stimuli were intermixed with neutral stimuli within 
each block, leading to uncertainty regarding the upcoming distractor in each trial. In this 
circumstance, a reduction in the emotional interference was still found, ruling out the possibility 
that the emotional distraction was strategically attenuated only due to the predictability of the 
emotional nature of the stimulus. Moreover, emotional interference declined even when emotional 
distractors were presented rarely among neutral stimuli with a variable interval between their 
appearance, and therefore in a condition in which there was a scarce possibility of knowing, 
preemptively, when the images would have an emotional content (Experiment 1b). This last finding 
is important in that it shows that the reason that allocation of attention is prioritized to rare 
emotional stimuli is not because such stimuli may carry important information, as Grimshaw and 
collaborators suggest. Conversely, the degree to which rare emotional stimuli interfere with 
performance is merely modulated by the high occurrence of distractors, independently of their 
content (overall frequency of distractor occurrence). Our results therefore suggest that observers 
learn to ignore emotional distractors, rare or not, when they have enough experience with task-
irrelevant stimuli, even if these are neutral distractors.  
 Another possible explanation for the lack of emotional interference in the high frequency 
context that Grimshaw and collaborators found is an overall decline in motivational engagement. 
This explanation entails that observers did not learn to inhibit emotional distractors but, rather, 




hence captured less attention. In order to explore this issue, in the current experiments, we decided 
to manipulate the frequency of distracting images in a within-subject design by presenting a low 
frequency and a high frequency block to each participant, and randomizing the order of 
presentation of the two blocks between two groups of observers. It was found that the emotional 
interference in the low frequency context was not reduced for those participants who had 
previously been exposed to a high distracting context, ruling out the hypothesis that observers 
become less motivationally engaged through several exposures to emotional images. Since the 
emotional interference was greatly reduced in the high frequency context and there were no 
crossover effects in the subsequent low frequency context, it was confirmed that the overall 
frequency of distractor occurrence was the critical factor determining the degree to which 
emotional stimuli captured attention and distracted observers in a given context. It is therefore 
possible that the frequent exposure to distractors triggered a top-down filtering mechanism which 
was rapidly disengaged when task-irrelevant images appeared only rarely. 
 Concerning the stage at which the emotional processing impacted the high frequency 
context, here ERPs were used to track picture processing prior to overt responses, focusing on the 
LPP, which has been suggested to reflect the evaluative processing of the emotional stimulus and 
the activation of the motivational systems. Interestingly, it was found that the content of the 
distractors was still processed by the brain, as indicated by the persistence of the affective 
modulation of the LPP, despite the behavioural interference being strongly attenuated. Specifically, 
it was found that the evaluative processing of emotional stimuli, and the engagement of 
motivational systems, was not affected by emotional distractor frequency (Experiment 1a). This 
persistence of the LPP suggests that it is crucial to evaluate the emotional content of emotional 
distractors independently of how frequently these stimuli occur. Moreover, the emotional 




frequent neutral distractors (Experiment 1b), compared to a low frequency context in which 
distractors appeared rarely, possibly suggesting an enhanced motivational engagement due to an 
enhanced categorical distinctiveness of the emotional stimuli. In fact, it is possible that the frequent 
occurrence of neutral images generated a homogeneous, uniform neutral context from which 
emotional images emerged because they represent a distinct, unique category, and this uniqueness 
makes them more significant.  
Importantly, the comparison between different measures of emotional processing is critical in 
highlighting that the processing of emotional stimuli is not completely prevented in the high 
frequency context as hypothesized in previous work (Grimshaw et al., 2017), suggesting that the 
decline of emotional interference is due to an inhibitory mechanism that selectively impacts 
attentional capture (using behavioral interference as a classical or “gold standard” measure in 
cognitive psychology) after the semantic processing of emotional distractors and engagement of 
motivational systems has occurred.   
In the light of all these observations, one of our main question regarded the nature of the 
attentional control that subtended the decrease in emotional interference, and specifically if this 
control was learned over time or occurred immediately. If this reduction was the result of practicing 
to overcome distraction, then emotional interference should be expected to decrease gradually 
over time. Critically, in Experiment 1a (see the Discussion session) we split the high frequency block 
in three mini-blocks of 100 trials each and we found that performance was just aided from the first 
100 trials through the end of the block, indicating that participant’s ability to control distraction was 
evident from the beginning. To confirm this result, we conducted the same analysis in Experiment 
1b. Again, no reliable habituation emerged across the mini-blocks [Mini-block (3 levels) x Valence 




stem from a gradual learning process, but it is quickly engaged as soon as the occurrence of 
distractors become likely.  
A possible explanation for the rapid attenuation of the emotional interference is that 
observers become effective in focus their attention on the task, or on its location (i.e., a facilitation 
of the task processing). Several studies have demonstrated that when attention is explicitly cued to 
the location in which the target will appear, an abrupt onset that appears in a different location fails 
to capture attention (Yantis and Jonides, 1990). In this case, the task was constantly presented at 
the center of the display, making it possible that observers learned to focus on that position at the 
start of each trial and indirectly ignore all the irrelevant stimuli appearing elsewhere. However, in 
two experiments, we found that the response times slowed down in the distractor-absent trials of 
the high frequency context, compared to the low frequency condition, whereas we should expect 
faster responses if the processing of the task were enhanced.  
Alternatively, it is possible that the attenuation of emotional distraction could be mediated 
by a spatially-specific inhibition of any sensory stimulus appearing in the distractor locations (Awh, 
Matsukura & Serences, 2003; Serences, Yantis, Culberson & Awh, 2004; Kelley and Yantis, 2009). In 
fact, although the irrelevant images could appear either to the left or to the right of the central task, 
these two positions were unchanged throughout the entire experiment, and so the distractor 
positions were both predictable and completely irrelevant for the primary task. Yet, a piece of 
evidence against this possibility is that the LPP was still enhanced in the high frequency block, 
indicating that participants continued to elaborate the emotional content of the images. If observers 
had become effective at filtering distractor information based on location, then the emotional 
content should have had no impact in the 80% block. Moreover, we found a rapid reduction of the 
emotional interference just in the first trials of the block, while a spatial suppression would likely 




content and the task relevance of the distracting pictures. In line with this hypothesis, Kelley and 
Yantis (2009) found that a spatially suppression of the distractor locations developed slowly as 
demonstrated by the fact that the interference of distracting images was attenuated gradually 
during the during the experiment. Critically, the authors provided evidence that the reduction of 
distractor interference was only in part attributable to a spatial inhibition, and concomitant 
processes were possibly implicated.  
Overall, the emotional interference effect found in the current study seems to reflect a 
specific inhibition of emotional distractor events rather than some indirect inhibitory processes such 
as their spatial positions or an enhancement of task processing, and such inhibition seems to be 






Experiment 2: Generalization of the learned rejection of distractors  
In the first study, it was demonstrated that attentional capture by novel and rare emotional stimuli 
was attenuated with frequent exposure to distractors, indicating that the brain can reject emotional 
distractor through experience. However, this attenuation was short-lasting and did not impact the 
emotional attentional capture when the frequency of distractor occurrence was low. Experiment 2 
was conducted in order to examine whether extensive practice with distractors promotes long-
lasting effects on emotional attentional capture. A previous study (Codispoti et al. 2016) has 
evaluated the effect of practice by demonstrating that observers quickly learn to ignore a set of 
emotional distracting images when repeatedly exposed to them, but are once again distracted as 
soon as novel images were presented, suggesting that the subtended learning process is stimulus-
specific and does not generalize to novel (i.e., never seen before) emotional events. For this reason: 
1) The main purpose of Experiment 2 is to investigate whether observers are able to attenuate 
attentional capture by novel and rare emotional stimuli after a practice session with variable 
task-irrelevant stimuli. Literature on perceptual salience indicates that novel (never seen) 
distractors fail to capture attention when presented after practice with variable distracting 
stimuli, while they still capture attention after a practice phase with the same repeated set 
of stimuli, suggesting that observers learn to reject task-irrelevant stimuli, rather than a 
specific stimulus, when dealing with completely different and unpredictable distracting 
events. Thus, observers learn to attenuate distraction and generalize this rejection to novel 
stimuli beyond the practice regime (Vatterott et al., 2018; Won and Geng, 2018; Kelley and 
Yantis, 2009). Two possible outcomes could result from this practice with variable distracting 
stimuli; on the one hand (a) we expect to attenuate the emotional interference effect after 




distractors is also effective in preventing attentional capture by emotional significant stimuli. 
Alternatively, it is possible that (b) practice with highly heterogeneous neutral distractors is 
not sufficient to prevent capture by significant emotional stimuli, meaning that rejection 
does not generalize to stimuli with a different semantic meaning, and hence emotional 
stimuli may cause interference despite practice.  
2) A further aim is to examine which stage of the emotional processing is affected by variable 
practice by comparing the emotional interference effect with the affective modulation of the 
LPP. At a cortical level, the affective modulation of the LPP seems to be unaffected by 
distractor experience, in terms of repeated exposure to the same distractors and frequent 
exposure to heterogeneous distractors. Thus, unlike what we expect for the behavioral 
interference (RT slowing), we should expect the LPP modulation to remain unmodulated by 
extensive practice with variable neutral stimuli, and a rejection of emotional stimuli occurs 









A total of 21 healthy students (11 females; ranging from 19 to 30 years of age) of the University of 
Parma (Italy) participated in the experiment as volunteers. All participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal visual acuity. The study was approved by the Ethical Committee of the Department of 
Psychology at the University of Parma, and prior to participating, all subjects signed an informed 
consent.  
 
Materials and design 
A total of 600 pictures were selected as distractor stimuli from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008), and from public domain pictures available on the 
Internet. The pictures comprised 30 pleasant (heterosexual erotic couples), 30 unpleasant 
(mutilated bodies), and 540 neutral (depicting human beings [n=60] and without human beings 
[n=480]; specifically, objects, animals, urban streets, building interiors, means of transport) images. 
The emotional pictures and “human” neutral pictures were those used in Experiment 1 (see 
Materials of Experiment 1 for subjective rating of valence and arousal, LPP modulation, and skin 
conductance changes in response to the viewing of these images). 
Images were displayed on a gray background of a 19 CRT monitor (60 refresh rate). Each scene 
subtended 14.3° horizontal by 10.8° vertical degrees of visual angle and were positioned either to 




distractor image and the center of the Gabor patch was 4° of visual angle. The Gabor patch 
(sinusoidal gratings with a Gaussian envelope), used for the orientation discrimination task, 
subtended 5.3° x 5.3° of visual angle and it could be horizontally or vertically oriented. Gabor 
patches were generated using custom MATLAB software by overlapping two distinct Gabor filters 
with the same orientation but different frequencies (0.94 and 9.4 frequency x visual angle, 
respectively).  
All stimuli were equated in brightness and contrast to control for potential confounds resulting from 
low-level visual properties of the images. Stimulus presentation and data collection were performed 
using E-Prime software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002).  
For each participant, all 600 images (60 emotional and 540 neutral) were presented during an 
experimental session. The session consisted of three phases: an initial Pre-Test phase, a Practice 
Phase and a final Post-Test phase.  
The experimental design is illustrated in Fig. 4.1. The Pre-Test and Post-Test phase were identical 
and consisted of 300 trials each in which distractors appeared randomly in 50% of the trials. The 
50% of trials in which distractors were present were subdivided into 10% emotional (half pleasant 
and half unpleasant) distractor trials and 40% neutral distractor trials; within the neutral category 
10% were “human”, and the remaining 30% of images belonged to non-human categories (trained 
neutral). The practice phase consisted of two blocks of 300 trials each, in which distractors 
appeared in 50 % of the trials, and were exclusively neutral non-human categories (trained neutral). 
Before the beginning of the experiment, participants performed a set of 150 practice trials, in which 
no distractors appeared, to familiarize themselves with the task.  
Across participants, emotional and human neutral pictures were randomly assigned to the Pre-Test 




Test, or Practice. Nevertheless, within each participant, no picture was ever repeated across the 
experiment (i.e., novel). The Pre-Test was introduced to effectively compare susceptibility to 
emotional distraction before and after practice, and, therefore, to evaluate the efficacy of the 
practice provided.  
In the Pre-Test and Post-Test, the order of trial type (trials without distractor, emotional distractor 
trials, and neutral distractor trials were pseudo-randomized with the restrictions that (i) the 
emotional pictures could occur no more than twice consecutively, (ii) emotional pictures of the 
same valence were never presented one after the other, (iii) pictures never appeared more than 
three times on the same side. E-prime software synchronized the presentation of the stimuli and 









Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants signed an informed consent form. They were then 
seated in a recliner in a small, sound-attenuated, dimly lit room, and the EEG sensor net was 
attached. Participants sat in front of the computer monitor with their head supported by a chinrest. 
The distance between their eyes and the monitor was 51 cm for all subjects.  
The experimental paradigm was the same as that used in Experiment 1 (Figure 4.2). Each trial 
started with the presentation of a uniform gray background displayed for 500 ms. This was followed 
by the appearance of a Gabor patch in the center of the screen for 150 ms. The participant’s task 
was to determine, as quickly and as accurately as possible, whether the Gabor patch was vertical or 
horizontal by pressing one of two buttons on the keyboard (“v” or “b”) with the index of their 
dominant hand. In distractor-present trials, a distractor image was presented simultaneously with 
the Gabor, appearing equally often in the left or right visual fields. During the Pre-Test and the Post-
Test, the image could be either emotional or neutral, while during the Practice phase all distractors 
were neutral. Participants were explicitly informed that there would be a distractor in some trials 
and were instructed to maintain fixation on the center of the screen, focusing their attention 
exclusively on the Gabor patch while ignoring distractor images. Consecutive trials were separated 
by a gray screen for a variable amount of time ranging from 1400 to 2000 ms (intertrial interval, ITI). 
During this period, behavioral responses to the orientation task were collected.  
Before the beginning of the experiment, participants performed a block of 150 trials in which 
distractors were never presented. During the experiment, they started with the Pre-Test phase, 
following by the Practice phase and the final Post-Test phase. Between each block a 5-min break 






Figure 4.2. Sequence of events and trial type in Experiment 2 
 
 
EEG recording and processing  
Electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz using the San Diego 
System with a 60 dense sensor array. All data were re-referenced to the average of all scalp 
electrodes. Additionally, a sensor was attached below the left eye. For each trial, EEGs were 
corrected for blinks and eye movements using a regression technique based on the electrodes 
above and below the left eye, and to the left and right side of the eyes (Schlögl et al., 2007). Off-line 
analysis was performed using Emegs (Peyk, De Cesarei, & Junghöfer, 2011). First, data were initially 
filtered (30 Hz low-pass and 0.1 Hz high-pass). Then, trials and sensors containing artifacts were 
detected through a statistical procedure specifically developed for dense-array EEG (Junghöfer, 
Elbert, Tucker, & Rockstroh, 2000). Trials containing a high number of neighboring bad sensors were 
discarded; for the rest of the trials, sensors containing artifactual data were replaced by 
interpolating the nearest good sensors. Finally, data were re-referenced to the average of all 




Averaged ERP waveforms were calculated according to factors Block and Trial Type. The region and 
time interval of interest were selected based on an initial examination of the ERP waveforms and 
topography. The LPP was scored as the average of the ERP waveform in the 450 and 900 ms after 
stimulus onset at the parieto-occipital sensor group (11 sensors: 33, 34, 35, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 51, 
52, 53) where the LPP amplitude was largest (Picton et al., 2000).   
 
Data collection and analysis 
Reaction times (RTs) and ERP analyses were performed only on accurate trials. The initial 150 trials 
served to acquaint participants with the task and were not included in the analyses. Trials with RTs 
shorter than 250 ms or longer than 1350 ms were treated as inaccurate. In each participant, for 
each valence of each condition, response times above or below three standard deviations from the 
mean were discarded as outliers.  
The primary purpose of the experiment was to determine whether rejection of neutral distractors 
generalizes to highly significant emotional stimuli, and at what stage of processing the novel stimuli 
are rejected. Hence, data were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) for 
within-subject factors Phase (two levels: Pre-Test, Post-Test) and Valence (two levels: human 
neutral, emotional). We compared emotional stimuli with human neutral stimuli, since they were 
balanced in terms of frequency of occurrence, and since neither of these categories were presented 
during the Practice phase. To deal with violations of sphericity, a Huynh-Feldt correction was applied 
to the degrees of freedom. For each ANOVA test, the partial eta squared statistic (η2p), that indicates 








Response Times (RTs). Figure 4.3 illustrates reaction times to the Gabor orientation task. As 
expected, slower RTs were observed for rare emotional, compared to neutral, distracting pictures 
during the Pre-Test block. However, this emotional interference was attenuated in the Post-Test 
block, but still largely enhanced, suggesting that practice with variable neutral distractors was not 
sufficient to prevent attentional capture by significant emotional distractors.  
Statistically, analysis of RTs yielded a significant effect of Valence, F (1, 20) = 13.642, p = .001, η2p = 
.405, indicating that participants were slower at responding to the task when an image with an 
emotional, compared to a neutral content appeared, F(1,20) = 13.642, p = .001 , η
2
p = .405. A 
significant effect of Phase was also observed, F(1,20) = 10.764, p = .004 , η
2
p = .350, simply 
confirming that, the overall RT performance improved  as a function of practice, with faster RTs in 
the Post-Test phase compared to the Pre-Test phase. More importantly, we found a significant Block 
x Trial Type interaction, F(1, 20) = 5.739, p = .026, η2p = .223. Following up on this interaction, we 
tested the Phase effect for each picture Valence: emotional distractors as well as neutral distractors 
interfered more (slower RT) in the Pre-Test than in the Post-Test [emotional: F(1, 20) = 11.519, p = 
.003, η2p = .365, neutral: F(1, 20) = 7.860, p = .011, η
2
p = .282]. Yet, when testing the Valence effect 
in each Phase, we found that RTs were slower for emotional compared to neutral distractors in both 
the Pre-Test (55,68), F(1, 20) = 14.852, p = .001, η2p = .426 and, although attenuated, in the Post-
Test block (M= 31.48), F(1, 20) = 8.210, p = .010, η2p = .291, indicating that the interference 
reduction after practice was larger for emotional compared to neutral pictures. 
Considering that behavioral interference of emotional stimuli was only attenuated with variable 




distinctiveness. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed whether neutral categories that were presented 
only during Test phases (human neutral categories) differed from the categories viewed during the 
practice phase (trained neutral categories). However, the interaction Phase x Neutral Type (human, 
trained) was not significant, F(1, 20) = 3.078, p = .095, η2p = .133, ruling out the possibility that 
categories of distractors never seen during the practice captured attention due to their 
distinctiveness.  
Accuracy. Overall accuracy was high (mean: 96.4%; see Table 2 in the Appendix C). Analysis of 
accuracy failed to show any significant main effect of Valence and Phase, or a Phase x Valence 
interaction, Fs< . 09, ps>.05 
.  
 
Figure 4.3. Effect of practice with variable neutral distractors on reaction times in Experiment 2a. Error bars show ±1 SEM calculated 







Late Positive Potential 
As shown in Fig. 4.4, emotional images elicited a larger positivity over parietal sensors in the 450-
900 ms time interval, and practice in rejecting heterogeneous neutral distractors had no effect on 
this emotional modulation of the LPP. 
During the Pre-Test, the LPP was clearly modulated by stimulus Valence, F(1, 21) = 26.276, p < .001, 
η2p = .556, with pictures with an emotional content eliciting a pronounced LPP compared to those 
with neutral contents. A significant effect of Phase was observed, F(1, 21) = 2.134, p = .159, η2p = 
.092,  showing that the overall amplitude of the LPP reduced after practice. Critically, the interaction 
Phase x Valence, F(1, 21) = 1.215, p = .283, η2p = .055, failed to reach significance, indicating that 
affective modulation of the LPP did not vary between the two phases. Consistently, the LPP 
amplitude continued to be enhanced during viewing of task-irrelevant emotional, compared to 
neutral pictures, regardless of the practice [Pre-Test (M= 1.56 µV), F (1, 21) = 34.300, p < .001, η2p = 






Figure 4.4. Effect of practice with variable neutral distractors on the (A) LPP amplitude in Experiment 2a. Error bars show ±1 SEM 
calculated within participants using the method of O’Brien and Cousineau (2014). (B): Grand-averaged ERP waveforms averaged over 
parieto-occipital sensors used for the analysis of the LPP for neutral and emotional pictures in the Pre-Test and in the Post-Test. 






The findings of Experiment 1 suggest that when observers were trained to inhibit all variable and 
perceptually-complex neutral distractors, they were able to generalize this inhibition to emotional 
stimuli, despite the emotional interference and notwithstanding the fact that the affective 
modulation of the LPP still persisted.  
 The role of practice in attentional capture is a topic that has been investigated only recently. 
The literature indicates that prolonged exposure (practice) to distracting items induces distractor 
suppression and tunes attentional filters to the stimuli to be ignored. When the trained distractors 
are variable, the attentional filter encodes multiple features and encompasses broad 
representations, with the advantage of generalizing suppression more easily beyond the specific 
trained exemplars to other potential stimuli belonging to the same category (Dixon et al., 2009). 
Thus, “heterogeneous” practice is the prerequisite for the generalization of distractor suppression, 
whereas “homogeneous” practice with the same repeated stimulus prompts efficient suppression 
of the specific learned distractors only (Kelley and Yantis, 2009; 2010; Vatterott et al., 2012; 2018). 
So far, to our knowledge, this “practice effect” has been mostly demonstrated using perceptually 
simple neutral distractors (Vatterott et al., 2018; Geng et al., 2018), figure-ground compositions (i.e., 
objects without a background), or meaningless objects (Kelley and Yantis, 2009). The current 
experiment extends these prior results by demonstrating that practice with a high variety of neutral 
natural scenes, depicting meaningful and perceptually-complex situations, fosters a generalizing 
suppression of images with novel contents, including emotionally relevant stimuli. In fact, the 
interaction found in this study was highly informative in the sense that it showed an even stronger 
attenuation of behavioral interference for emotional, compared to neutral, distractors, further 




On the other hand, it is also important to mention that the interference of emotional distractors did 
not disappear after practice, indicating that these stimuli were still effective in prompting an 
orienting response and thus behavioral interference. Moreover, the emotional modulation of the 
LPP was completely unaffected by practice with neutral distractors, maintaining an enhanced 
positivity for emotional distractors across the whole experiment, which may reflect the obligatory 
engagement of motivational systems regardless of practice with distractors.   
 Considering these findings, a question arises: Do observers need specific practice 
(experience) with emotional distractors in order to effectively inhibit their processing? The decline 
of the emotional interference seems to be due to a general inhibition of task-irrelevant stimuli, 
which is learned during practice with highly variable neutral distractors. A more direct and sustained 
experience with emotional distractors might be necessary to tune a specific filter which is highly 
effective in preventing the processing of task-irrelevant emotional categories. The impact of this 
type of practice may be even more evident at the level of engagement of motivational systems, 
reflected in the LPP affective modulation, which did not show even a hint of practice effect in 
Experiment 2a.  To examine these hypotheses, a second experiment was conducted by maintaining 
the conditions of Experiment 2a unchanged, with the critical exception that observers performed a 






Experiment 2b - Practice with variable emotional distractors 
 
Method 
The same method as that described in Experiment 2a was used, with the variation described below 
in the Design and Procedure section. 
 
Participants  
A total of 22 healthy students (16 females; ranging from 18 to 30 years of age) of the University of 
Parma (Italy) participated in the experiment as volunteers, and signed an informed consent form 
prior to beginning the experiment. The study was approved by the Ethical Committee of the 
Department of Psychology at the University of Parma. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal visual acuity and none of them were color blind. All participants were naïve as to the aim of 
the experiment. Due to technical problems 7 of the 22 participants were removed from EEG 
analyses.  
 
Design and procedure  
In Experiment 2b, we used the same design and procedure as that used in Experiment 2a with the 
exception that during the practice phase only emotional pictures were presented (Fig. 5.1). During 
the Pre-Test and the Post-Test, we used the same emotional and neutral images as those in 
Experiment 2a. A total of 300 new emotional pictures were selected from public domain pictures 
available on the Internet to be presented during the practice phase: half were pleasant 




Across participants, emotional and neutral pictures were randomly assigned to the Pre-Test or to 
the Post-Test. Nevertheless, within each participant, no picture was ever repeated across the 
experiment (i.e., novel). Before the beginning of the experiment, participants performed a set of 
150 practice trials, in which no distractors appeared, to familiarize themselves with the task. In the 
Pre-Test, Post-Test, and Practice phases, the order of trial type (distractor-absent trials, emotional 
distractor trials and neutral distractor trials) was pseudo-randomized with the restrictions that (i) 
the emotional pictures could occur no more than twice consecutively, (ii) emotional pictures of the 
same valence were never presented one after the other, (iii) pictures never appeared more than 
three times on the same side. The same restrictions were used for emotional stimuli during the 
practice phase. E-prime software synchronized the presentation of the stimuli and triggered EEG 








Data collection and analysis 
As in Experiment 2a, reaction times (RTs) and ERP analyses were performed only on accurate trials. 
The initial block of 150 trials served to acquaint participants with the task and these trials were not 
included in the analyses. Trials with RTs shorter than 250 ms or longer than 1350 ms were treated as 
inaccurate. In each participant, for each valence of each condition, response times above or below 
three standard deviations from the mean were discarded as outliers. The statistical design was 
identical to that described in Experiment 2a. 
 
Results 
Behavioral measures  
Response times. As illustrated in Figure 5.2, slower RTs were observed for emotional compared to 
neutral distractors during the Pre-Test block. Critically, the emotional interference effect 
disappeared in the Post-Test block, suggesting that practice with variable emotional distractors 
exerts a long-lasting effect on emotional attentional capture leading to the inhibition of novel rare 
emotional images. 
The analyses revealed pronounced main effects of both factors. As expected, participants were 
clearly slower to respond to the task when a distracting image had an emotional (pleasant, 
unpleasant) rather than a neutral content [Valence, F (1, 21) = 7.198, p = .014, η2p = .255].  
Moreover, responses were faster in the Post-Test compared to the Pre-Test, indicating thqt 
participants became faster over time in responding to the task [Phase, F (1, 21) = 15.075, p = .001, 
η2p = .418]. More importantly, the Phase x Valence interaction, F(1, 21)=6.623, p=.018, η
2
p=.240, 
was significant. Following up on this interaction we found slower responses for both emotional and 




p=.001, η2p=.424; neutral trial F(1, 21)= 11.014, p=.003, η
2
p=.344]. Critically, when testing the 
Valence effect in each Phase a significant emotional interference (difference between emotional 
and neutral stimuli) was found only in the Pre-Test (M= 38.50), F(1, 21)=10.568, p=.004, η2p=.335, 
and disappeared in the Post-Test (M= 11.67), F(1, 21)= 1.533, p=.229, η2p=.068. 
 
Accuracy. Overall accuracy was high (M=95.6%; see Table 2 in the Appendix C); however, we found 
a significant main effect of Valence, indicating that participants were less accurate in responding to 
the task when viewing an emotional rather than a neutral image, F(1, 21)=6.396, p=.020, η2p=.233. 
No significant effect of Phase was showed, F(1, 21)= .030, p=.863, η2p=.0013. A significant Block x 
Trial Type interaction was observed, F(1, 21)= 4.905, p=.038, η2p=.189, and following up on this 
interaction, an emotional interference effect was found during the Pre-Test, F(1, 21)= 10.315, 
p=.004, η2p=.329, but not during the Post-Test, (p>.05), thus ruling out a speed-accuracy trade-off as 
an explanation of RT performance.  
 
 
Figure 5.2. Effect of  practice with  variable emotional distractors on reaction times in Experiment 2b. Error bars show ±1 SEM 





Late Positive Potential 
As expected, the LPP showed a clear affect modulation in the Pre-Test and, surprisingly, a reduction 
in the Post-Test, indicating that the extent to which rare emotional distractors are processed 
changes with extensive practice with variable task-irrelevant emotional stimuli.  
The Late positive potential was modulated by Block, F(1,14)=14.150, p=.002, η2p=.503 and the 
Valence of the distractor, F(1,14)=11.249, p=.005, η2p=.446. Critically, the interaction Phase x 
Valence was significant, F(1,14)=12.667, p=.003, η2p=.475; specifically, in the Post-Test emotional 
contents elicited a more pronounced late positive potential compared to neutral contents,  (M= 
0.49 µV), F(1,14)=4.928, p=.043, η2p=.260, but this affective modulation (difference between 







Figure 5.3. Effect of practice with variable emotional distractors on the (A) LPP amplitude in Experiment 2b. Error bars show ±1 SEM 
calculated within participants using the method of O’Brien and Cousineau (2014). (B): Grand-averaged ERP waveforms averaged over 
parieto-occipital sensors used for the analysis of the LPP for neutral and emotional pictures in the Pre-Test and in the Post-Test. 







Consistent with Experiment 1, the occurrence of task-irrelevant emotional stimuli diverted 
attentional resources, slowing down the response times in the concurrent task, and activated the 
motivational systems, as indicated by the enhanced late positive potential. In addition, Experiment 2 
suggests that the processing of task-irrelevant emotional stimuli changed as a function of the 
practice phase with variable distractors, despite these stimuli being rare, and, hence, even more 
significant. Accordingly, emotional interference was reduced after a practice session in which 
participants were required to ignore variable neutral distractors (Experiment 2a) and was eliminated 
after practice with variable emotional distractors (Experiment 2b). Moreover, the degree to which 
emotional stimuli were evaluated, and engaged the motivational systems, decreased after extensive 
exposure to task-irrelevant and inconsequential emotional stimuli (Experiment 2b), as shown by the 
attenuation of the affective modulation of the LPP. However, even after practice, emotional 
distractors persisted in engaging the motivational systems. Altogether, these findings suggest that 
emotional attentional capture is not an obligatory process, but one that is highly shaped by 
experience and learning mechanisms.  
A recent study by Kelley and Yantis (2009) examined a similar issue, namely how practice 
affects the deployment of selective attention in order to filter distracting neutral stimuli. In their 
study, observers were asked to ignore all variable, peripheral, neutral images while performing a 
central discrimination task. Observers became faster at responding to the task with practice and, 
more importantly, new distracting images failed to capture attention when presented in novel (not 
trained) positions after the practice phase, indicating generalization of the inhibitory process. From 
their findings, the authors suggested that heterogeneous practice with numerous to-be-ignored 
features induces several inhibitory connections among numerous cortical areas, generating such a 




are different from those in the practice block. The findings of Kelley and Yantis mirrored the current 
results, which examined improved inhibition not only for neutral but also for emotional distracting 
images. The idea that the attentional allocation system learns to suppress emotional distracting 
stimuli through practice is appealing; however, the current findings are open to numerous 
alternative explanations.  
 On one hand, it is quite evident that attentional capture by emotional stimuli, and its 
interference in the overt response (reaction times) is quite a flexible process, that can also be 
attenuated with general practice with any kind of distractor, not necessarily only with emotional 
contents; on the other hand, it remains unclear whether the lack of emotional RT modulation in the 
post-test that followed the emotional practice session (Experiment 2b) reflects active filtering of any 
kind of emotional stimulus, or some other habituation process. Extensive practice with emotional 
distractors only may provide a high familiarization with certain stimulus categories, making them 
easier to recognize, and thus faster to ignore. In this case, the mechanism responsible for the 
attenuation of emotional capture after practice is not due to direct experience with emotional 
stimuli as distractors, but a more general exposure to emotional pictures. Future investigations may 
disentangle this issue by comparing the effect of a practice phase in which emotional stimuli are 
task-irrelevant (as in Experiment 2b) with a practice phase in which the emotional content of the 
stimulus is task-relevant (e.g., to discriminate whether a picture is pleasant or unpleasant). If 
participants learn specifically to reject emotional stimuli in virtue of the fact that they are task-
irrelevant (i.e., distractors), attending to them throughout a practice session in which they are task-
relevant should interrupt any suppression in the Post-Test when, once again, they become 
distractors to be ignored. 
Another possible explanation of the absence of emotional interference after emotional 




emotional stimuli used in the practice phase are all novel, never repeated, pictures, they belong to 
only a few categories that share several features among picture exemplars, especially within each 
valence (i.e., mutilations and erotica). Thus, an orienting response to these pictures may habituate 
as a consequence of the redundancy of features across different distractors (blood, naked 
bodies, etc.). This account implies that the habituation of OR to distractors should apply only to 
emotional images that share the same features during practice, and not to the completely novel 
emotional category. Considering that highly arousing emotional stimuli, like those depicting 
mutilation and erotica, are equally effective in capturing attention, future studies may consider 
using only one category (e.g., erotic couples) during practice and a different category (e.g., 
mutilation) in the pre- and post-tests, ruling out the possibility that the decrease of attentional 
capture in the Post-Test may be due to habituation to simple features of the emotional category.  
The findings of Experiment 2 give some indication that the emotional distraction changed as 
a function of practice and of the type of practice. In fact, exposure to neutral distractors only was 
not sufficient to prevent emotional interference, and a specific practice phase with variable 
emotional distractors seemed to aid the filtering. Although the two types of practice seemed to 
induce different effects on emotional interference when analyzed separately, a direct statistical 
comparison between the two studies showed a similar pattern (p = n.s). It should be noted that the 
low statistical power (because of the low sample size of the two experiments) could explain the lack 
of statistical significance; however, future studies are necessary in order to clarify whether, and to 
what extent, practice with emotional stimuli induces more effective filtering of emotional 
distractors. For example, the difference between the two types of practice, if any difference exists, 
should clearly emerge through a more extensive practice phase (similar to practice used in studies 
on perceptual learning) In fact, protracted exposure to distracting stimuli through several sessions 












General discussion  
 
 
The current thesis aims to examine the role of experience and learning in the allocation of 
attention to novel (never repeated) emotional distractors, as reflected in behavioral interference 
(response times) and cortical correlates of affective processing (ERPs; Late positive potential), both 
in terms of distractor frequency and practice. In this chapter, I will discuss the main findings by 
highlighting their importance regarding the initial aims of this research. 
The primary aim of the current thesis was to examine to what extent experience with task-
irrelevant stimuli modulates the interference of emotional distractors. Experiment 1 clearly shows 
that frequent exposure to task-irrelevant stimuli was effective in attenuating the interference 
caused by emotional distractors in the primary ongoing task. Interestingly, emotional distraction was 
attenuated also in contexts in which rare emotional distractors were interspersed among frequent 
neutral distractors, and therefore when these stimuli were even more distinct and unexpected. 
These findings answer our main question, suggesting that attentional capture by emotional stimuli 
is not impenetrable by top-down control, but the attentional allocation system adapts by ignoring 
irrelevant emotional stimuli throughout contextual experience. Importantly, susceptibility to being 
distracted by task-irrelevant emotional stimuli changes rapidly as a function of the context. In fact, 
emotional interference was reduced exclusively in contexts in which task-irrelevant stimuli appeared 
too frequently (i.e., in the majority of trials) and did not persist in subsequent contexts in which the 
occurrence of distracting stimuli was rare, suggesting that the subtended inhibitory control was 




In Experiment 2, it was found that distractor experience could induce a long-lasting effect on 
emotional attentional capture. Specifically, observers became less susceptible to being distracted by 
the appearance of task-irrelevant emotional stimuli after extensive exposure (practice) to 
heterogeneous neutral distractors, suggesting that observers learn to inhibit them for the 
successfully completion of the task. Interestingly, emotional interference almost vanishes through 
extensive exposure to variable emotional distractors, indicating that although emotional stimuli are 
significant they do not capture attention in a mandatory fashion. 
It is important to emphasize that these findings have implications for our understanding of 
attentional allocation in the affective processing domain. Our results show that it is possible to 
ignore emotional stimuli that are entirely novel, that is, stimuli that have never been encountered 
before, a term that within an experiment implies that a stimulus is not repeated. We demonstrated 
that experience with variable task-irrelevant stimuli (namely: distractor frequency and extensive 
practice) is effective in attenuating the interference of novel emotional images, and these results 
are important considering that in real-life situations we are often exposed to distractors with a 
variable and unpredictable appearance.  
Importantly, the observation that emotional interference decreased, and in some 
circumstances, disappeared, suggests that the emotional content of the image no longer impacted 
picture processing, and emotional distractors were effectively inhibited. However, the inhibition of 
task-irrelevant emotional stimuli may occur at a different stage of processing, and it has recently 
been demonstrated that the semantic processing of emotional stimuli can occur even when their 
behavioral interference in the main task disappears (Codispoti et al., 2016). In order to clarify which 
stage of emotional processing was affected by distractor frequency and by practice with distracting 
stimuli, we recorded ERPs to track picture processing before the behavioral response, and we 




of the emotional cues and the engagement of cortico-limbic motivational systems. Interestingly, it 
was found that the affective modulation of the LPP was only slightly affected by distractor frequency 
(Experiment 1) as well as by practice with distractors (Experiment 2a). Even an extensive practice 
phase with a high number of emotional distractors did not drastically reduce the LPP affective 
modulation (Experiment 2b). Therefore, these findings, taken together, indicate that emotional 
distractors are evaluated, and engage motivational systems, even when their behavioral 
interference in the primary task is inhibited, and, consequently, when they do not cause distraction. 
The dissociation reported in the current study between the affective modulation of the LPP 
and the emotional interference adds evidence to the emerging consensus that electrophysiological 
and behavioral measures of distraction, even if often observed together, do not correlate. In 
deviance distraction literature, for example, it has recently been found that behavioral distraction 
produced by the presentation of a rare, different sound disappeared when the sound became 
uninformative, meaning that it did not predict the occurrence of the subsequent target, but still 
elicited a P3a response. This dissociation was interpreted by the authors as the fact that rare salient 
sounds always undergo some involuntary evaluation processes, but translate into behavioral 
distraction only when informative (Parmentier 2014), suggesting that distractor interference is 
controlled by further, and presumably later, mechanisms. Considering that the behavioral 
interference caused by distractors is the standard measure used in cognitive psychology to 
investigate attentional capture, findings that the behavioral interference is attenuated in the 
absence of a similar attenuation of the emotional modulation of the LPP, possibly indicates that the 
distractor experience selectively modulates the attentional processes, after the emotional stimulus 
has been evaluated. Interestingly, a dissociation between the affective modulation of the LPP and 
emotional interference has been previously reported in response to stimulus repetition (Codispoti, 




massive repetition of emotional images, the behavioral interference disappeared rapidly. From their 
findings, they proposed that while evaluative processes are mandatory, and continue to engage the 
motivational system, attentional processes are not necessary after several repetitions of the same 
stimulus, suggesting that these two processes may occur independently in order to prevent limited 
attentional resources from being allocated to clearly irrelevant emotional stimuli. 
It should be noted that, in the current studies, observers were exposed to emotional 
distracting images that were never repeated, and although emotional interference was strongly 
attenuated in all the experiments, it disappeared only when exposure to emotional distractors was 
prolonged over time. Moreover, in both studies, experience affected the emotional interference 
selectively rather than prompting a general interference of task-irrelevant stimuli; in fact, frequent 
exposure to task-irrelevant stimuli attenuated only the interference of pictures with an emotional 
content and no effect was found on neutral distracting images. Moreover, after the practice session 
the interference of emotional stimuli was attenuated to a greater extent compared to that of 
neutral stimuli. One interpretation of these findings is that novel emotional stimuli are evaluated 
and capture attentional resources every time that they appear, therefore, in a fairly mandatory 
fashion. However, attentional dwell-time on emotional distracting images reduced when observers 
acquire experience with distracting images, suggesting that in these situations the categorization of 
emotional stimuli as irrelevant and innocuous occurs faster. The evaluative system may orient the 
organism toward the stimulus (what is it?), and when the stimulus is categorized as novel (not 
previously encountered), it triggers an attentional allocation to it in order to enhance its processing 
and prepare the organism for action. Through experience, observers learn which stimuli are relevant 
and which are irrelevant, and attentional resources are rapidly disengaged from the emotional 
content of the image in order to be re-oriented to the concurrent primary task. Considering that 




compared to neutral stimuli, the hypothesis that experience affects the attentional dwell-time, or 
rapidity of disengagement, could better explain the reason why we found a selective attenuation of 
emotional interference.  
In accord with our hypothesis, a recent study failed to find an effect of distractor frequency on the 
emotion-induced blindness (EIB) effect (Zhao & Most, 2018). To notice, the EIB effect is investigated 
by using RSVP paradigms in which the emotional content of a picture is not spatially decoupled from 
the task, and hence no orientation of attention is needed. In that sense, it is possible that distractor 
experience specifically affects processes relating to subcomponents of spatial capture of attention, 
such as the attentional shift towards the emotional distracting image, or the subsequent attentional 
engagement with the image or the disengagement from the image. 
By far, in literature on perceptual distraction, it has been suggested that frequent or 
extensive exposure to distracting stimuli trigger a proactive control, which anticipates the 
occurrence of a distractor and suppress related attentional processing of the stimulus. Although the 
attenuation of emotional interference that we found in response to distractor experience could be 
similarly attributed to a proactive control of emotional distraction, is it really necessary to refer to 
such mechanism or can we explain our results as a reactive control? With the disengagement 
hypothesis, we suggest that attention to emotional distractors is reactively inhibited (i.e., 
terminated) so that the task-oriented behavior may resume.  
Future studies are required to disentangle whether the decline of behavioral interference 
reflects a reduced allocation of attentional resources or a faster disengagement of attention. In this 
regard, it could be useful to test the effect of distractor exposure (both in terms of frequency and of 
practice) on specific spatial attention tasks such as the dot probe paradigms in which it is possible to 
disambiguate which attentional processes between attentional engagement and attentional 




distractor experience on clinical populations, as in people with anxiety disorder, who are known to 






















As shown by the figure on the left, analyses of RTs yielded a significant effect of Trial Type, F (2, 38) =44.856, p < .001, 
η
2
p = .702. No significant effect of Block was observed, F (1,19) = 1.428, p = .247, η
2
p = .070. Finally, a significant 
interaction Block x Trial Type was found, F (2, 38) =12.039, p < .001, η
2
p = .388. Following up on this interaction, the 
Block effect was tested for each Trial Type: emotional stimuli slowed down response times more when they appeared in 
the 20% block than in the 80% block, F (1, 19) =7.737, p = .012, η
2
p = .289, while no difference was found for neutral 
distractors between the two blocks, F (1, 19) =1.142, p = .299, η
2
p = .057. Conversely, participants were faster to respond 
to the task in the 20% block than in the 80% block during trials in which distractors were absent, F (1, 19) = 5.693, p = 
.028, η
2
p = .231. More importantly, the emotional interference effect was affected by the frequency of distractor 
occurrence, as confirmed by a significant Block X Valence interaction, F (1, 19) =4.464, p = .048, η
2
p = .190. Following up 
on this interaction, we found that a Valence effect was still present in the 80% block (M= 32.60 ms), F(1, 19) =23.886, p 
< .001, η
2
p = .557, but it was severely attenuated compared to the 20% block (M= 56.67 ms), F(1, 19) = 21.993, p < .001, 
η
2
p = .537. 
As shown by the figure on the right, the late positive potential was modulated by Trial Type, F (2, 38) = 36.716, p < .001, 
η
2
p = .659. No significant main effect of Block was observed, F (1, 19) = .062, p = .805, η
2
p = .003. A significant Block X 
Trial Type interaction, F (2, 38) = 3.290, p =.048, η
2
p = .148 was followed by simple main effect tests. LPP amplitude was 
more positive when viewing a rare emotional image in the 80% block than in the 20% block, F (1, 19) = 4.283, p =.052, 
η
2
p = .184, while there was no variation between the two blocks when viewing neutral images, F (1,19) = 2.208, p =.154, 
η
2
p = .104. In the same way, there was no difference in distractor-absent trials between the two blocks, F (1,19) =.212, p 
=.650, η
2
p = .011. Overall, the emotional modulation of the LPP differed between the two blocks, F (1, 19) = 5.201, p = 
.034, η
2
p = .215, and further investigation as to the effect of Valence in each block confirmed that emotional stimuli 
prompted a larger LPP compared to neutral stimuli in both the 20% block (M= 0.93 μV), F(1, 19) = 19.940, p < .001, η
2
p = 
.512 and the 80% block (M= 1.74 μV), F(1, 19) = 28.615, p < .001, η
2
p = .601 showing, critically, that the emotional 
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